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Constitutional Outliers 
Justin Driver† 
Legal scholars often contend that prominent Supreme Court opinions inter-
pret the Constitution in a manner that invalidates outliers—measures found in 
only a small number of states, rather than spread throughout the nation. Despite 
the term’s ubiquity in constitutional conversation, law professors have dedicated 
scant attention to exploring either its conceptual underpinnings or its conceptual 
borders. This paucity of scholarly attention is regrettable because the term has be-
come enshrouded in analytical confusion, which severely diminishes its utility and 
instills deep misperceptions about the Supreme Court’s role in issuing outlier-
suppressing opinions. 
This Article—the first extended effort to cast a critical eye on the notion of 
constitutional outliers—aims to clarify understanding of the concept by dispelling 
three principal sources of analytical confusion. First, although scholars over-
whelmingly invoke the term “outlier” as though it were a single entity, scrutinizing 
the Court’s outlier-suppressing opinions demonstrates that four distinct concepts 
are in fact huddled together under the outlier umbrella: holdouts, upstarts, back-
ups, and throwbacks. When the Supreme Court invalidates each type of outlier, it 
eliminates a measure during a specific temporal moment, and conflating these 
moments often conceals their discrete implications for constitutional theory. Second, 
by identifying and disentangling these outlier variants, it becomes possible to 
appreciate how conventional assessments of outlier-suppressing opinions founder 
upon close examination. Contextualizing the Court’s outlier-suppressing opinions 
reveals, contrary to prevalent scholarly assumptions, that they do not invariably 
reject measures that the nation deems antiquated, backward, and insignificant to 
the constitutional order. Third, because law professors have never explicitly articu-
lated their criteria for identifying what constitutes an outlier, the term appears in 
legal scholarship in inconsistent and even contradictory fashions, as outlier-
minded theorists disagree whether some of the Court’s most celebrated opinions 
even fit within the outlier rubric. In an effort to foster increased coherence with the 
term’s usage, this Article provides specific guidelines for distinguishing outliers 
from nonoutliers and identifies instances  in which scholars have used the term in-
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appositely. Bringing outliers to the very center of scholarly inquiry recasts dominant 
understandings of critical constitutional opinions—and the institution that issued 
them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A little more than two decades ago, tucked into the middle 
of a not especially well-known law review article, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook introduced a new term to describe the Supreme 
Court’s role in constitutional interpretation. Seeking to chal-
lenge the notion that the judiciary often vindicates individual 
rights in the face of national opposition, Easterbrook imported a 
term from statistics to suggest that the Court’s constitutional 
opinions typically invalidate practices found in only a small 
number of states. “The Court’s role in civil liberties . . . has been 
that of a follower, not a leader,” Easterbrook explained.1 “It ex-
tirpates in the name of the Constitution practices that have al-
ready disappeared or dwindled among the states. It obliterates 
outliers.”2 
 
 1 Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U Chi L Rev 349, 370 
(1992). 
 2 Id (emphasis added). See also Frank E. Grubbs, Procedures for Detecting Outly-
ing Observations in Samples, 11 Technometrics 1, 1 (1969) (“An outlying observation, or 
‘outlier,’ is one that appears to deviate markedly from other members of the sample in 
which it occurs.”); Vic Barnett and Toby Lewis, Outliers in Statistical Data 32 (Wiley 3d 
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Since its debut in 1992, usage of the term “outlier” has pro-
ceeded along a path from the foreign to the familiar, as it is now 
deeply embedded within scholarly constitutional discourse. To-
day, a strikingly large number of prominent constitutional law 
scholars—including Professors Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Steven 
Calabresi, William Eskridge, Roderick Hills, Michael Klarman, 
Lucas Powe, Jeffrey Rosen, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Mark 
Tushnet, and Keith Whittington—employ the term outlier in 
their scholarship.3 This eclectic collection of scholars, along di-
mensions both ideological and methodological, might be thought 
incapable of agreeing on just about any question in constitutional 
law.4 But the group is firmly united in the belief that under-
standing the Supreme Court’s role in constitutional interpreta-
tion demands understanding the Court’s penchant for suppressing 
outliers. These professors insist that many of the Court’s canonical 
constitutional decisions during the twentieth century and beyond 
can helpfully be examined through the outlier lens. Merely a 
partial listing of the Court’s renowned opinions that legal scholars 
 
ed 1994) (stating that an outlier observation is “jar[ring]” because it “stands out in con-
trast to other observations, as an extreme value”). 
 3 See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Prece-
dents and Principles We Live By 112 (Basic Books 2012) (contending that the Supreme 
Court takes account of what he calls the nation’s “lived Constitution” by invalidating out-
lier statutes); Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 211–12, 240, 286, 288 (Belknap 2011) 
(referring to the Court’s invalidation of outlier statutes); Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional 
Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 Ohio St L J 1097, 1113–15 (2004) (observing the 
Court’s invalidation of outliers); William N. Eskridge Jr, Some Effects of Identity-Based 
Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 Mich L Rev 2062, 
2373 (2002) (referring to the Court’s outlier-suppressing role); Roderick M. Hills Jr, 
Counting States, 32 Harv J L & Pub Pol 17, 19–23 (2009) (referring to the Court’s outlier-
suppressing function); Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights 453 (Oxford 
2004) (“More constitutional law than is commonly supposed reflects this tendency to con-
stitutionalize consensus and suppress outliers.”); L.A. Powe Jr, The Politics of American 
Judicial Review: Reflections on the Marshall, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, 38 Wake 
Forest L Rev 697, 716 (2003) (contending that the Warren Court “forc[ed] outliers to con-
form to national values”); Jeffrey Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts 
Serve America 4, 89, 124, 203 (Oxford 2006) (referring to the Court’s outlier-suppressing 
role); David A. Strauss, Book Review, Not Unwritten, After All?, 126 Harv L Rev 1532, 
1551–52 (2013) (contending that the Court’s outlier-suppressing function is “an impor-
tant feature of American constitutional law”); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment 
Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 Harv L Rev 246, 260–64 (2008) (highlighting the 
Court’s outlier-suppressing opinions); Mark Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters 98–
105 (Yale 2010) (emphasizing the significance of constitutional outliers); Keith E. 
Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy 105 (Princeton 2007) (empha-
sizing the Court’s role in suppressing outliers). 
 4 The group contains not only liberals and conservatives, but also self-avowed 
originalists and dedicated opponents of originalism. 
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contend have suppressed outliers might include the following 
ten cases: Griswold v Connecticut,5 Harper v Virginia State 
Board of Elections,6 Gideon v Wainwright,7 Romer v Evans,8 Ply-
ler v Doe,9 Moore v City of East Cleveland,10 United States v Vir-
ginia,11 Coker v Georgia,12 Lane v Wilson,13 and Kennedy v Lou-
isiana.14 These ten decisions span an extremely wide array of 
constitutional doctrines, underscoring the notion’s transsubstan-
tive nature. 
 
 5 381 US 479, 485–86 (1965) (invalidating Connecticut’s anticontraceptive statute). 
See also Eskridge, 100 Mich L Rev at 2372 n 1436 (cited in note 3) (construing Griswold 
as suppressing an outlier); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties Revolution, 82 Va L Rev 1, 16 (1996) (same); Sunstein, 122 Harv L Rev at 260 
(cited in note 3) (same); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 
76 U Chi L Rev 859, 878–79 (2009) (same). 
 6 383 US 663, 666 (1966) (invalidating Virginia’s poll tax). See also Balkin, Living 
Originalism at 240 (cited in note 3) (construing Harper as invalidating an outlier); 
Klarman, 82 Va L Rev at 16–17 (cited in note 5) (same). 
 7 372 US 335, 344–45 (1963) (invalidating Florida’s effort to deny counsel to an 
indigent criminal defendant accused of a felony). See also Amar, America’s Unwritten 
Constitution at 121 (cited in note 3) (construing Gideon as invalidating an outlier); 
Klarman, 82 Va L Rev at 16–17 (cited in note 5) (same). 
 8 517 US 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating Colorado’s effort to preclude homosexuality 
from receiving protection under local antidiscrimination laws). See also Eskridge, 100 
Mich L Rev at 2372 n 1436 (cited in note 3) (construing Romer as invalidating an outlier); 
Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 Cal L 
Rev 1721, 1749 (2001) (same); Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters at 140 (cited in 
note 3) (suggesting that Romer might be viewed as invalidating an outlier). 
 9 457 US 202, 230 (1982) (invalidating Texas’s effort to exclude unauthorized im-
migrants from public schools). See also Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S Cal L Rev 
381, 414 (1997) (construing Plyler as suppressing an outlier). 
 10 431 US 494, 506 (1977) (invalidating a local housing ordinance in Ohio that pro-
hibited some family members related by blood from cohabiting). See also Klarman, 82 Va 
L Rev at 16–17 (cited in note 5) (characterizing Moore as striking down a local outlier); 
Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 882 (cited in note 5) (same); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Con-
stitution Away from the Courts 144 (Princeton 1999) (same). 
 11 518 US 515, 557–58 (1996) (invalidating Virginia’s effort to prohibit women from 
enrolling at an all-male military academy). See also Eskridge, 100 Mich L Rev at 2372 n 
1436 (cited in note 3) (construing Virginia as invalidating an outlier); Klarman, 70 S Cal 
L Rev at 414 (cited in note 9) (same); Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 873–74 (cited in note 5) 
(same); Sunstein, 122 Harv L Rev at 262–63 (cited in note 3) (same). 
 12 433 US 584, 600 (1977) (invalidating Georgia’s effort to permit the death penalty 
to be imposed for rape). See also Klarman, 82 Va L Rev at 16–17 (cited in note 5) (con-
struing Coker as rejecting an outlier); Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch at 203 (cited 
in note 3) (same). 
 13 307 US 268, 276–77 (1939) (invalidating Oklahoma’s effort to retain a grandfather 
clause for voting purposes). See also Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 236 
(cited in note 3) (construing Lane as suppressing an outlier). 
 14 554 US 407, 446–47 (2008) (invalidating Louisiana’s effort to permit the death 
penalty to be imposed for raping children). See also Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 864–65 
(cited in note 5) (construing Kennedy as suppressing an outlier). 
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While outlier terminology has become an increasingly famil-
iar feature of constitutional conversation, familiarity in this par-
ticular instance has bred not so much contempt as inattention.15 
Among constitutional scholars, outlier-suppressing opinions are 
frequently identified but seldom scrutinized. Indeed, no law re-
view article or book chapter has ever been dedicated primarily to 
identifying and analyzing either the conceptual underpinnings 
or the conceptual borders of the outlier phenomenon in constitu-
tional law. This paucity of sustained scholarly examination is lam-
entable because it has permitted the Court’s outlier-suppressing 
opinions to become enshrouded in analytical confusion.16 
This Article aims to clarify understanding of the outlier con-
cept in constitutional law by dispelling three principal sources of 
analytical confusion. The first area in need of clarity stems from 
scholars using the term outlier as though it were a single entity, 
when it is actually composed of multiple entities. Upon close in-
spection, it becomes possible to discern four distinct concepts 
huddled together under the outlier umbrella, which this Article 
labels: holdouts, upstarts, backups, and throwbacks. The Supreme 
Court invalidates each of these outlier variants during a particu-
lar temporal moment, and failing to distinguish among them often 
conceals their discrete implications for constitutional theory. 
When the Court invalidates a holdout—as with Griswold’s rejec-
tion of an anticontraceptive statute that dated back eight dec-
ades—it eliminates a measure that, although perhaps once 
prevalent, has now receded and exists in at most a few remaining 
jurisdictions. When the Court invalidates an upstart—as with 
Romer’s rejection of an antigay referendum that passed only 
four years earlier—it eliminates a measure that represents a 
departure from the dominant mode and exists in at most a few 
jurisdictions. When the Court invalidates a backup—as with 
Virginia’s rejection of the effort to preserve an all-male military 
academy by creating an all-female institution—it eliminates the 
adoption of a substitute measure that is designed to retain either 
a recently invalidated model, or one that seems headed toward 
 
 15 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 18 
(Harvard 1980) (“Familiarity breeds inattention, and we apparently need periodical re-
minding that ‘substantive due process’ is a contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green 
pastel redness.’”). 
 16 Paucity, not absence. Tushnet has to date provided the most thorough and in-
sightful examination of constitutional outliers as a phenomenon. See Tushnet, Why the 
Constitution Matters at 98–105 (cited in note 3). As will become apparent, however, my 
account departs from Tushnet’s in significant ways. 
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invalidation soon. When the Court invalidates a throwback—as 
with Kennedy’s rejection of an effort to impose capital punish-
ment for raping a child—it eliminates a measure that seeks to 
revive a model from an earlier era that has disappeared. While 
the term outlier can accurately communicate that the Court in-
validated laws or practices existing in only a small number of 
states, it provides no insight whatsoever into the context sur-
rounding that invalidation. Where the outlier label provides 
merely a snapshot of state practices, the variant labels provide 
the moving pictures—rendering it possible to distinguish fading 
embers from flickering sparks. 
Second, by distinguishing among these outlier variants, it 
also becomes possible to appreciate the ways in which many 
conventional scholarly understandings of outlier-suppressing 
opinions founder upon close examination. Scholars have often 
asserted that when the Supreme Court invalidates outliers, it 
attacks antiquated measures and replaces them with modern 
views. Although this modernization theory may well capture the 
dynamic for outlier-suppressing opinions invalidating holdouts 
and backups, it fails to convey the dynamic for upstarts and—
perhaps somewhat surprisingly—for throwbacks. When the ju-
diciary invalidates upstarts and throwbacks, in fact, it may 
come closer to the mark to view those decisions as resisting, 
rather than enabling, modern views. Similarly, paying insuffi-
cient heed to the distinctions among outliers has led scholars to 
claim that when the Court issues outlier-suppressing opinions, it 
diminishes tension posed by the countermajoritarian difficulty 
and simultaneously increases tension with the ideals of federal-
ism. But both of these claims, as it turns out, are dramatically 
overdrawn. Understanding that outliers come in different vari-
ants also complicates broad scholarly claims asserting that out-
lier-suppressing opinions invariably reject measures that the 
nation as a whole deems backward and arguing that such deci-
sions are, therefore, insignificant to the constitutional order. It 
is erroneous to assume that, simply because a measure currently 
exists in a small number of states, underlying national support 
for the measure must be modest. To the contrary, some outlier-
suppressing opinions have invalidated statutes that appear to 
enjoy significant popularity across the nation. Accordingly, some 
outlier-suppressing opinions can be viewed as ensuring that 
measures currently found in a small number of states do not 
spread across the country. Simply because a law is an outlier, in 
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other words, does not mean that the views it embodies are nec-
essarily considered outlandish. 
Third, the dearth of sustained outlier analysis has even 
resulted in confusion and unacknowledged disagreement regarding 
whether some of the Supreme Court’s most celebrated opinions 
in its entire history—Brown v Board of Education of Topeka,17 
Loving v Virginia,18 and Lawrence v Texas19—can accurately be 
viewed as fitting within the outlier rubric. Disagreement exists 
in large part because outlier-minded theorists have never explic-
itly articulated their criteria for identifying how widespread a 
measure can become and still legitimately be deemed an outlier. 
Rather than permitting these idiosyncratic identification methods 
to persist without comment, this Article initiates an overdue 
conversation regarding what, exactly, qualifies as an outlying 
measure by proposing specific guidelines for identifying them. 
The outlier criteria advanced here suggest that scholars have 
sometimes used the term too promiscuously, applying it to judi-
cial opinions that invalidate practices that are fairly widespread 
throughout the nation and—in the process—stretching the term 
virtually beyond recognition. Some scholars will almost certainly 
disagree with my normative assessments regarding how the ter-
ritory of constitutional outliers should be demarcated. Dis-
agreements about my proposed conceptual borders are welcome, 
however, because they would elicit sustained analysis of what 
constitutes an outlier. And such exchanges over the fundamental 
meaning of constitutional outliers have thus far been conspicuous 
in their absence. 
None of these efforts to interrogate and clarify the meaning 
of outliers as a term in constitutional discourse should be mis-
taken for contending that the word should be purged from legal 
scholarship. To the contrary, the term presents a welcome addi-
tion to our constitutional vocabulary, as it arms scholars with a 
helpful appellation for identifying opinions that invalidate 
measures found in only a small number of states. Its usage en-
courages professors to note the actual magnitude of Supreme 
Court opinions, and represents a major advancement over the 
blithe assumptions of yore when scholars asserted a decision 
radically altered legal conditions throughout the land when it in 
fact tackled a relatively isolated practice. The term outlier, in 
 
 17 347 US 483 (1954). 
 18 388 US 1 (1967). 
 19 539 US 558 (2003). 
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sum, merits the essential place it has so rapidly attained in con-
stitutional discourse. It is precisely because the overarching 
term is so helpful, however, that its usage must be examined 
and refined in order to alleviate the analytical confusion that 
currently abounds. Scholarly invocations of the term outlier 
demonstrate no signs of abating anytime soon. If anything, usage 
appears to be intensifying, as new scholars continue to add the 
word to their constitutional lexicons, and early converts seem to 
use the term with ever-escalating frequency. Before the term be-
comes even more widespread, and the attendant confusion fol-
lows suit, it seems well worthwhile attempting to ascertain, with 
much greater precision than currently exists, what we talk 
about when we talk about outliers.20 
The balance of this Article unfolds as follows. Part I develops 
a taxonomy of constitutional outliers and analyzes how several 
of the Court’s leading outlier-suppressing opinions fit into that 
taxonomy. Building on this taxonomy, Part II challenges leading 
academic portrayals of the Court’s outlier-suppressing opinions 
as rejecting measures that the nation deems antiquated, back-
ward, and insignificant to the constitutional order. Part III 
pivots to explore the conceptual boundaries of outliers and esta-
blishes criteria for distinguishing outliers from nonoutliers. A 
brief conclusion follows. 
I.  THE ANATOMY OF OUTLIERS 
This Part provides a taxonomy of constitutional outliers by 
breaking down that broad phenomenon into its smaller compo-
nents. Legal scholarship analyzing the judiciary’s invalidation of 
outliers would be improved by conceiving of those opinions as in-
validating holdouts, upstarts, backups, and throwbacks. After 
briefly defining the characteristics of each outlier variant, the 
bulk of this Part analyzes opinions in which the Supreme Court 
can be understood as having invalidated the pertinent type of 
outlier. The outlier-suppressing opinions analyzed herein should 
be understood as illustrative rather than exhaustive, as this 
Part makes no effort to identify and analyze every opinion that 
scholars contend rejected an outlier measure. 
 
 20 Consider Raymond Carver, What We Talk about When We Talk about Love 
(Knopf 1981). 
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A. Holdouts 
An outlier that is a holdout involves a state law or practice 
that, although perhaps once prevalent, has now receded and ex-
ists in, at most, a few remaining jurisdictions. The jurisdiction 
that retains the formerly widespread model, that is, holds out 
from adopting what has become the dominant mode. In so doing, 
holdouts prevent what seems to be a nearly defunct model from 
altogether vanishing. 
In Griswold, the Supreme Court in 1965 invalidated consti-
tutional law’s best-known holdout: a Connecticut statute dating 
back to 1879 that prohibited even married couples from using 
contraceptives.21 Many justices who considered the Connecticut 
law highlighted the anticontraceptive statute’s lengthy—if not 
exactly august—lineage and suggested that the law embodied a 
remnant from a previous era. In Poe v Ullman,22 when the Court 
initially determined that the law presented a nonjusticiable 
question in 1961, Justice Felix Frankfurter’s opinion for the 
Court nevertheless noted, “The Connecticut law prohibiting the 
use of contraceptives has been on the State’s books since 1879.”23 
Frankfurter’s next sentence noted, perhaps for the many law-
yers with mathematical difficulties, it had been “more than 
three-quarters of a century since its enactment.”24 Justice John 
Marshall Harlan II’s much-celebrated dissenting opinion in Poe 
similarly contended that anticontraceptive laws “may be regarded 
as characteristic of the attitude of a large segment of public 
opinion on this matter through the end of the last century,” and 
noted that modern criticisms understood such laws to stem from 
“a bygone day.”25 When the Court in Griswold reconsidered the 
statute—a mere fourteen years shy of its centennial—the brief 
challenging the law amplified Harlan’s point, calling it “a relic of 
. . . a psychological attitude which, if it ever were, is no longer 
part of the mainstream of American life and thought.”26 The 
brief supported this assertion by noting that only Connecticut 
and Massachusetts continued to regulate contraceptives in the 
 
 21 Griswold, 381 US at 527 (Stewart dissenting). 
 22 367 US 497 (1961). 
 23 Id at 501. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id at 546 n 12 (Harlan dissenting). 
 26 Brief for Appellants, Griswold v Connecticut, Docket No 496, *24 (US filed Feb 
11, 1965) (available on Westlaw at 1965 WL 92619) (“Griswold Appellants’ Brief”). 
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marital context.27 Strikingly, even Griswold’s two dissenting jus-
tices heaped scorn on the statute. Justice Hugo Black’s dissent 
called the law “offensive” and “evil.”28 Justice Potter Stewart’s 
dissent—in addition to deeming the law “uncommonly silly” and 
suggesting that it was perhaps “even asinine”—encouraged voters 
to jettison the antiquated model.29 “If, as I should surely hope, 
the law before us does not reflect the [current community] stan-
dards of the people of Connecticut,” Stewart wrote, “the people of 
Connecticut can . . . persuade their elected representative to re-
peal it.”30 
In Harper, the Supreme Court held that states could no 
longer retain the poll tax in state elections without violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.31 The poll 
tax, whose origins stretched back well into the nineteenth cen-
tury, had once been a common practice.32 By the time the Court 
decided Harper in 1966, however, the Twenty-Fourth Amend-
ment prohibited the practice in federal elections, and states also 
had overwhelmingly rejected the practice in their own elections. 
As Justice William O. Douglas’s opinion for the Court in Harper 
noted, “Only a handful of States today condition the franchise on 
the payment of a poll tax.”33 Of the four holdouts that retained 
the practice, moreover, Douglas observed that lower courts had 
recently invalidated poll taxes for Alabama and Texas.34 Douglas 
construed Harper not as vindicating the vision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s framers, but as attacking an outmoded practice 
that offended modern understandings of equality. “[T]he Equal 
Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a par-
ticular era,” Douglas explained.35 “In determining what lines are 
 
 27 See id. Whereas the Connecticut law prohibited using contraceptives, the Massa-
chusetts law prohibited distributing contraceptives. See David J. Garrow, Liberty and 
Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade 70 (Macmillan 1994). 
 28 Griswold, 381 US at 507 (Black dissenting). 
 29 Id at 527, 531 (Stewart dissenting). 
 30 Id at 531 (Stewart dissenting). Like Frankfurter’s opinion in Poe, Stewart’s dis-
sent began: “Since 1879 Connecticut has had on its books a law which forbids the use of 
contraceptives by anyone.” Id at 527 (Stewart dissenting). One of the underappreciated 
oddities in Douglas’s strikingly odd opinion for the Court in Griswold is its failure to note 
either the statute’s vintage or its highly unusual status. 
 31 Harper, 383 US at 670. 
 32 See Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in 
the United States 111–12 (Basic Books 2000). 
 33 Harper, 383 US at 666 n 4 (noting that—in addition to Virginia—Alabama, Miss-
issippi, and Texas also retained the poll tax). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id at 669. 
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unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined 
to historic notions of equality . . . . Notions of what constitutes 
equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do 
change.”36 Although three justices dissented in Harper because 
they thought that the opinion exceeded the bounds of judicial 
propriety, they nonetheless agreed that the poll tax was an idea 
whose time had gone. Observing that Harper altered the prac-
tices of merely four states, Harlan conceded: “Property and poll-
tax qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current 
egalitarian notions of how a modern democracy should be orga-
nized.”37 Black’s dissent similarly allowed that he “dislik[ed] the 
policy of the poll tax” and found it “outdated.”38 
In Gideon, the Supreme Court in 1963 famously determined 
that the Sixth Amendment afforded all criminal defendants 
charged with felonies the right to counsel, even if they could not 
afford an attorney.39 Far less commonly appreciated, however, is 
that the overwhelming majority of the nation already adhered to 
the rule that Gideon would articulate even before the Court 
issued its landmark decision. Although the Court noted as late 
as 1942 in Betts v Brady40 that “the great majority of the States” 
did not afford counsel to indigent criminal defendants,41 only five 
holdout states continued to deny that right when the Court de-
cided Gideon.42 Even among the five holdouts, moreover, at least 
some counties within four of the five states appear to have of-
fered counsel to indigent defendants.43 For instance, had Clarence 
Gideon been arrested in one of Florida’s more populous counties, 
like Dade or Broward, he would have been entitled to counsel.44 
Black’s opinion for the Court in Gideon thus stood on firm 
ground in identifying a “widespread belief that lawyers in criminal 
 
 36 Id (emphasis omitted). 
 37 Harper, 383 US at 686 (Harlan dissenting). 
 38 Id at 675, 678 (Black dissenting). 
 39 Gideon, 372 US at 342–45. For an account of the case, see generally Anthony 
Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet (Random House 1964). See also Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: A 
Biography 180–83 (Yale 1990). 
 40 316 US 455 (1942). 
 41 Id at 471. 
 42 See Brief for the Petitioner, Gideon v Cochran, Docket No 155, *30 (US filed Nov 
21, 1962) (available on Westlaw at 1962 WL 115120) (“Gideon Petitioner’s Brief”) (noting 
that only Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina resisted the 
trend). 
 43 See id at *30–31 (cited in note 42). See also Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel 
and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on “The Most Pervasive Right” of an Accused, 
30 U Chi L Rev 1, 19–20 (1962). 
 44 See Kamisar, 30 U Chi L Rev at 20 (cited in note 43). 
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courts are necessities, not luxuries.”45 In Gideon’s conclusion, 
Black expressly noted that, among the twenty-five states that 
weighed in at the Supreme Court, a lopsided number urged the 
abandonment of Betts as a relic, even when the case was initially 
decided: “Florida, supported by two other States, has asked that 
Betts v. Brady be left intact. Twenty-two States, as friends of the 
Court, argue that Betts was ‘an anachronism when handed 
down’ and that it should now be overruled. We agree.”46 Similarly, 
the merits brief that Abe Fortas filed on behalf of Gideon con-
tended that only a scarce few locales continued clinging to the 
bygone model: “The task here is essentially a modest one: to 
bring into line with the consensus of the states and professional 
opinion the few ‘stragglers’ who persist in denying fair treat-
ment to the accused.”47 
B. Upstarts 
An outlier that is an upstart involves a state law or practice 
that represents a departure from the dominant mode and exists 
in, at most, a few jurisdictions. The first few jurisdictions that 
adopt an innovation, that is, start up a model that has yet to be-
come widely adopted. There is no guarantee, of course, that the 
upstart model will eventually sweep the nation, transforming 
what was an upstart into a newly dominant norm. Some up-
starts, for better and for worse, simply remain upstarts. Yet it is 
crucial to bear in mind that upstarts at least potentially signify 
the wave of the future, rather than a mere legislative blip. 
In Romer, the Supreme Court in 1996 invalidated a state-
wide referendum that Colorado voters passed four years earlier 
that prohibited state entities from treating sexual orientation as 
a protected attribute.48 Three liberal enclaves in Colorado—
Aspen, Boulder, and Denver—had previously expanded antidis-
crimination laws to protect homosexuality, and the referendum, 
titled Amendment 2, in effect aimed to repeal that local legisla-
tion. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, deter-
 
 45 Gideon, 372 US at 344. 
 46 Id at 345. 
 47 Gideon Petitioner’s Brief at *32 (cited in note 42). See also id at *11, quoting 
Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 653 (1961) (“We believe that ‘time has set its face’ against 
Betts v. Brady.”). Intriguingly, when Mapp declared that the time had elapsed for deeming 
illegally seized evidence admissible, 50 percent of the states still employed the practice. 
See Mapp, 367 US at 680 (Harlan dissenting). 
 48 Romer, 517 US at 623–24. 
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mining that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause, 
repeatedly framed the measure as representing a sharp depar-
ture from standard legislation, one that constituted a decidedly 
unwelcome upstart.49 Amendment 2, Kennedy wrote, not only 
“confounds [the] normal process of judicial review,” but it also 
“defies . . . conventional inquiry.”50 Because no other statewide 
measure had previously deprived gays and lesbians of legal pro-
tections they had won at the local level, Kennedy could contend: 
“It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this 
sort.”51 Kennedy asserted Amendment 2’s “disqualification of a 
class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from 
the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence,” and suggested 
“[t]he absence of precedent for Amendment 2 is itself instruc-
tive.”52 
In Plyler, the Supreme Court in 1982 invalidated a recently 
enacted Texas statute that permitted local school districts to ex-
clude school-aged unauthorized immigrants from their public 
schools.53 At that time, no other state had enacted legislation de-
signed to eliminate unauthorized immigrants’ access to educa-
tion.54 Intriguingly, although the justices might have plausibly 
cast the Texas statute as an idiosyncratic departure from long-
standing practice, they declined to portray Plyler as involving a 
jarring legislative innovation, applicable to only one state. To 
the contrary, Justice William Brennan’s opinion for the Court 
expressly noted that unauthorized immigrants “now live within 
 
 49 See id at 623–36. 
 50 Id at 632–33. 
 51 Id at 633. See also id (noting that “laws singling out a certain class of citizens for 
disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare”); id, quoting Louisville Gas & Electric 
Co v Coleman, 277 US 32, 37–38 (1928) (“[D]iscriminations of an unusual character 
especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the 
constitutional provision.”). 
 52 Romer, 517 US at 633. Romer’s depiction of the Colorado referendum as an unde-
sirable upstart bore strong similarities to the amicus brief submitted in the case by Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe. See Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, et al, as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents, Romer v Evans, Docket No 94-1039, *3 (US filed June 9, 1995) (available 
on Westlaw at 1995 WL 17008432) (“Never since the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has this Court confronted a measure quite like Amendment 2—a measure 
that, by its express terms, flatly excludes some of a state’s people from eligibility for legal 
protection from a category of wrongs.”). For an early notice of the close connection be-
tween the arguments contained in Romer and Tribe’s brief, see Linda Greenhouse, Colo-
rado Law Void, NY Times A1 (May 21, 1996). 
 53 Plyler, 457 US at 230. 
 54 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Rule States Must Pay to Educate Illegal Alien 
Pupils, NY Times A1, D22 (June 16, 1982) (noting that Texas’s law was “the only one 
cutting off school funds for illegal aliens in the nation”). 
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various States,” and framed the decision as one holding national 
implications.55 Similarly, Justice Lewis Powell began his concur-
ring opinion by taking pains to emphasize that the Lone Star 
State was far from alone in feeling the effects of unauthorized 
immigration. “Access from Mexico into this country, across our 
2,000-mile border, is readily available and virtually uncontrolla-
ble,” Powell wrote, before explicitly stating, “This is a problem of 
serious national proportions.”56 Not surprisingly, the four dis-
senting justices agreed with the Plyler majority that the case 
raised important questions for the nation, rather than exclusively 
for Texas.57 
In Moore, the Supreme Court in 1977 determined that a lo-
cal housing ordinance that permitted nuclear families to occupy 
a single household, but prohibited some extended families from 
doing so, violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.58 Although the Supreme Court had previously authorized 
local governments to limit occupants of a residence to families, 
East Cleveland’s upstart ordinance defined “family” in such a 
narrow way as to prevent Inez Moore, a grandmother, from liv-
ing with one of her grandchildren.59 The five justices who voted 
to invalidate the ordinance emphasized that East Cleveland’s 
statutory definition of “family” sharply deviated from traditional 
definitions. Writing for a plurality, Powell called the ordinance 
“unusual,” and suggested that it flouted “[t]he tradition of un-
cles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a 
household along with parents and children.”60 That tradition, 
Powell insisted, “has roots . . . equally deserving of constitutional 
recognition” as protections afforded to nuclear families.61 In a simi-
lar vein, Brennan’s concurring opinion labeled the statute “sense-
less,” “arbitrary,” and “eccentric.”62 Justice John Paul Stevens’s 
opinion concurring in the judgment submitted that the ordi-
nance was not merely rare or odd, but genuinely one of a kind, as 
 
 55 Plyler, 457 US at 205. See also id at 224, 230 (explicitly taking account of the 
costs to “the Nation” from Texas’s statute). 
 56 Id at 237 (Powell concurring). 
 57 See id at 242 (Burger dissenting). 
 58 Moore, 431 US at 505–06. For an overview of Moore’s factual and legal backdrop, 
see generally Peggy Cooper Davis, Moore v. East Cleveland: Constructing the Suburban 
Family, in Carol Sanger, ed, Family Law Stories 77 (West 2008). 
 59 Moore, 431 US at 496 n 2, 498–99 (Powell) (plurality), citing Village of Belle 
Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1 (1974). 
 60 Moore, 431 US at 496, 504. 
 61 Id at 504. 
 62 Id at 507 (Brennan concurring). 
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no locality had previously ventured such a constricted conception 
of family. “There appears to be no precedent for an ordinance 
which excludes any of an owner’s relatives from the group of 
persons who may occupy his residence on a permanent basis,” 
Stevens wrote.63 At least one of the dissenting justices thought 
that the bizarre nature of East Cleveland’s statutory innovation 
should militate in favor of affirming its constitutionality. Justice 
Byron White contended that, precisely because the ordinance 
departed from the norm, affected residents should have little dif-
ficulty relocating outside of East Cleveland, “an area with a ra-
dius of three miles and a population of 40,000.”64 While the ordi-
nance precluded Moore from residing “with all her 
grandchildren in this particular suburb,” White noted “she is 
free to do so” anywhere beyond this statute’s modest reach.65 
C. Backups 
An outlier that is a backup involves the adoption of a re-
placement state law or practice designed to preserve as much as 
possible of a legal model that either has recently been invalidated 
or seems certain to be invalidated in the near future. The few 
jurisdictions that respond to invalidation or its threat by seeking 
to retain the model, that is, back up or reinforce the preceding 
order, often by making only the slightest modifications. In so 
doing, backups attempt to extend the life of a model that has 
been marked for extinction. 
In Virginia, the Supreme Court in 1996 rejected the state’s 
efforts to avoid admitting women to the all-male Virginia Mili-
tary Institute (VMI) by devising a new educational program that 
would be available only to females.66 After a lower court previ-
ously found that the gender exclusion violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, Virginia sought to preserve VMI’s all-male status 
by introducing the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership 
(VWIL).67 By the 1990s—when Virginia introduced VWIL to back 
up VMI—not only did all of the federal military academies admit 
women, but South Carolina was the only other state that still 
 
 63 Id at 520 (Stevens concurring in the judgment). 
 64 Moore, 431 US at 550 (White dissenting). 
 65 Id (White dissenting). For an illuminating commentary exploring a similar cri-
tique, see Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 S Ct Rev 329, 390–91. 
 66 Virginia, 518 US at 519, 558. 
 67 See id at 525–26. 
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contained an all-male military institution of higher education.68 
VWIL would not mirror VMI’s distinctive “adversative” military 
training, but instead would focus on building self-esteem in a co-
operative environment.69 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s opinion 
for the Court concluded that the hastily created VWIL did not 
offer women an equivalent educational environment and suc-
ceeded only in extending VMI’s existence as an all-male enclave: 
“Virginia . . . while maintaining VMI for men only, has failed to 
provide any comparable single-gender women’s institution. In-
stead, the Commonwealth has created a VWIL program fairly 
appraised as a pale shadow of VMI in terms of the range of cur-
ricular choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni 
support and influence.”70 In Ginsburg’s assessment, Virginia’s 
effort to reinforce VMI by erecting VWIL strongly resembled 
Texas’s earlier effort to preserve racial segregation by creating 
an all-black law school after a lower court ruled that it could not 
categorically exclude blacks.71 The Supreme Court had, of 
course, invalidated Texas’s second-rate law school in Sweatt v 
Painter,72 and Ginsburg concluded that Sweatt’s logic compelled 
the same action in Virginia: “In line with Sweatt, we rule here 
that Virginia has not shown substantial equality in the separate 
educational opportunities the Commonwealth supports at VWIL 
and VMI.”73 
In Coker, the Supreme Court in 1977 held that the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibited 
states from imposing the death penalty for raping an adult.74 
The Court’s decision in Coker arrived five years after the Supreme 
Court cast severe doubt on capital punishment’s legitimacy as a 
 
 68 See id at 569 (Scalia dissenting). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also underscored 
that VMI had been founded more than 150 years earlier and noted that many leading 
universities initially refused to admit women but had long since abandoned all-male 
higher education. See id at 520–21, 536 (majority) (noting that VMI opened in 1839); id 
at 536–39 (majority) (noting admission practices at Harvard and other leading schools). 
 69 Id at 548. 
 70 Virginia, 518 US at 553 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 71 See id (“Virginia’s VWIL solution is reminiscent of the remedy Texas proposed 50 
years ago, in response to a state trial court’s 1946 ruling that, given the equal protection 
guarantee, African-Americans could not be denied a legal education at a state facility.”). 
 72 339 US 629 (1950). 
 73 Virginia, 518 US at 554. 
 74 Coker, 433 US at 600. For an insightful examination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 
role in drafting an amicus brief challenging the Georgia statute at issue in Coker, see 
generally Melissa Murray, Inequality’s Frontiers, 122 Yale L J Online 235 (2013). 
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penalty for any crime in Furman v Georgia.75 In response to 
Furman, an overwhelming majority of states immediately re-
vised their statutes, making capital punishment a permissible 
punishment for at least some crimes.76 But, as White noted in 
his plurality opinion in Coker, a very small number of states 
that still treated rape as a capital offense at the time of Furman 
sought to retain rape as a death-eligible offense in their revised 
statutes following Furman.77 Indeed, of the sixteen states in 
which rape remained a capital offense in 1972, only three states 
provided the death penalty for raping an adult in their revised 
statutes.78 When the Court decided Coker, moreover, two of those 
states’ initial post-Furman death penalty statutes had been ju-
dicially invalidated altogether, and those states both omitted 
rape from their subsequent lists of death-eligible crimes.79 As 
White explained in Coker, “The upshot is that Georgia is the sole 
jurisdiction in the United States at the present time that 
authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult 
woman.”80 White’s Coker opinion can be understood, thus, as in-
validating Georgia’s retention of capital punishment for raping 
an adult at least in part because it backed up a practice that en-
joyed negligible legislative support throughout the nation. “The 
current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is 
not wholly unanimous among state legislatures,” White wrote, 
“but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital 
punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.”81 
In Lane, the Supreme Court in 1939 invalidated Oklahoma’s 
backup statute governing voter eligibility because it violated the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on race-based voting dis-
crimination.82 The Oklahoma legislature enacted the backup 
statute in a special session following the Supreme Court’s earlier 
decision in Guinn v United States,83 which invalidated the state’s 
 
 75 408 US 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). See also Coker, 433 US at 591–92 
(White) (plurality). 
 76 See David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of 
Abolition 231–55 (Belknap 2010). 
 77 Coker, 433 US at 593–94 (White) (plurality). 
 78 See id at 594 (noting that only Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina permitted 
capital punishment for raping an adult woman). 
 79 See id. 
 80 Id at 595–96. 
 81 Coker, 433 US at 596 (White) (plurality). 
 82 See Lane, 307 US at 275–77. 
 83 238 US 347 (1915). 
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“grandfather clause.”84 The backup statute at issue in Lane pro-
vided that anyone who voted in the election preceding the grand-
father clause’s invalidation automatically remained an eligible 
voter.85 For people who had not voted in the preceding election, 
the backup statute required these nonvoters to either register 
during an extremely short window or else permanently forfeit 
their voting rights.86 Oklahoma’s backup voting statute was the 
only one of its kind in the nation.87 Frankfurter’s opinion for the 
Court in Lane identified the statute as a backup measure, noting 
that the Oklahoma legislature’s special session was “obviously 
directed towards the consequences” of Guinn, and suggesting that 
the subsequent statute amounted to Guinn’s “simple-minded 
mode[ ] of discrimination” merely being replaced with a “sophis-
ticated” mode.88 After Guinn, Frankfurter wrote, “Oklahoma was 
confronted with the serious task of devising a new registration 
system consonant with her own political ideas but also consis-
tent with the Federal Constitution.”89 Frankfurter contended 
that what he referred to as Oklahoma’s “new scheme” smacked 
too much of the old order: “We are compelled to conclude . . . that 
the legislation . . . partakes too much of the infirmity of the 
‘grandfather clause’ to be able to survive.”90 
 
 84 Id at 367. Oklahoma’s grandfather clause exempted white Oklahomans from 
passing an otherwise-mandatory literacy test. See Lane, 307 US at 276. 
 85 Lane, 307 US at 270–71. 
 86 Id at 271. 
 87 See Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 236 (cited in note 3). In Klarman’s 
felicitous phrasing, Oklahoma’s backup statute “grandfathered the grandfather clause.” Id. 
 88 Lane, 307 US at 270–71, 275. 
 89 Id at 275. 
 90 Id at 270, 275. Lane is only one of many election-law cases that can be regarded 
as rejecting backup plans. In Harman v Forssenius, 380 US 528 (1965), a case that reso-
nates strongly with Lane, the Supreme Court in 1965 invalidated Virginia’s plan to sus-
tain the poll tax that state legislators passed when they anticipated (correctly) that the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment would win ratification. Id at 530–31, 544. Reading the 
handwriting on the constitutional wall, Virginia’s governor convened a special legislative 
session to preserve the poll tax to the greatest extent possible. Id at 531. Accordingly, the 
special session did not in any way alter the poll tax for state elections because the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment did not purport to touch those elections. See id. For federal elections, 
however, the special session enacted legislation permitting voters either to pay a poll tax 
or to file a certificate of residence before every election. Id at 531–32. Writing for a unani-
mous Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren deemed Virginia’s modified plan an unconstitu-
tional effort to preserve the poll tax by slightly diluting it: “For federal elections, the poll 
tax is abolished absolutely as a prerequisite to voting, and no equivalent or milder sub-
stitute may be imposed.” Id at 542. See also Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 US 339, 347–48 
(1960) (reversing dismissal of petitioners’ claims that a city’s redrawn district boundary 
lines were contorted to exclude nearly every black voter from the district). Relatedly, the 
Supreme Court’s successive rejection of numerous devices designed to maintain the 
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D. Throwbacks 
The rarest outlier variant is a throwback, which involves a 
state law or practice that strongly resembles a model from an 
earlier era that has now generally disappeared from the scene. 
The first jurisdictions that revive a version of what had become 
an abandoned mode, that is, throw back or recall one’s mind to a 
previous time with their newly enacted legislation or practices. 
In so doing, throwbacks breathe new life into a model that had 
been left for dead, but, as it turns out, was merely sleeping. 
In Kennedy, the Supreme Court in 2008 held that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibited states from imposing capital 
punishment for the crime of raping a child.91 Although Coker had 
made clear in 1977 that the death penalty was an impermissible 
punishment for raping an adult woman, at least some ambiguity 
existed well after Coker regarding whether states could impose 
capital punishment for raping a minor.92 During the initial post-
Furman era, three states had revised their death penalty stat-
utes to permit capital punishment for child rape.93 Yet state 
courts had, for various reasons, invalidated all three of those 
statutes stemming from the immediate post-Furman period.94 
But beginning in the mid-1990s—in the midst of frenzied national 
concerns about sexual assaults of children—states began enacting 
new measures that would make child rape a capital offense.95 As 
 
“white primary” in Texas can usefully be regarded as invalidating a series of backups. 
See Smith v Allwright, 321 US 649, 658–59 (1944) (recounting the Court’s many en-
gagements with the white primary in Texas over the previous seventeen years). Texas’s 
many efforts to back up the white primary following each judicial invalidation caused the 
Court’s run of decisions invalidating the various measures to resemble nothing so much 
as an extended session of Whac-A-Mole. 
 91 Kennedy, 554 US at 446–47. 
 92 Coker was somewhat unclear on the question, as the victim in the case was only 
sixteen years old when she was raped, but the Court’s decision regarded her as an adult. 
See Coker, 433 US at 592, 605 (White) (plurality). 
 93 See id at 595. 
 94 See Collins v State, 550 SW2d 643, 646 (Tenn 1977) (invalidating a mandatory 
capital punishment scheme); Buford v State, 403 S2d 943, 951 (Fla 1981) (holding capital 
punishment for sexual assault unconstitutional); Leatherwood v State, 548 S2d 389, 402–
03 (Miss 1989) (invalidating capital punishment for child rape on state-law grounds). 
 95 In 1994, Congress enacted a federal law requiring states receiving particular 
federal funds to create sex offender registries. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 1796, 2038–42, replaced by the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-248, 120 Stat 587, 600. 
Two years later, Congress passed Megan’s Law, which required public disclosure of the 
information contained in the sex offender registers. Megan’s Law, Pub L No 104-145, 110 
Stat 1345, 1345 (1996), replaced by the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 
Pub L No 109-248, 120 Stat at 600. For an overview of legislation responding to concerns 
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Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in Kennedy, Louisiana in 
1995 became the first of what eventually totaled six states that 
passed legislation permitting capital punishment for child 
rape.96 This new wave of legislation could not, in Kennedy’s es-
timation, counteract the “national consensus” opposing the 
death penalty for child rape, as forty-four states had declined to 
join the movement.97 Kennedy further suggested that an absence 
of such provisions in federal law undercut the six state meas-
ures.98 Writing on behalf of the four dissenting justices, Justice 
Samuel Alito suggested that what might be labeled the six 
throwback statutes at issue in Kennedy could have been a bud-
ding trend that may well have been on the verge of sweeping the 
nation. “I do not suggest that the six new state laws necessarily 
establish a ‘national consensus’ or even that they are sure evi-
dence of an ineluctable trend,” Alito wrote.99 “But they might . . . 
have been the beginning of a strong new evolutionary line. We 
will never know, because the Court today snuffs out the line in 
its incipient stage.”100 
E. Clarifications 
Before analyzing how this taxonomy of constitutional outliers 
both enriches and complicates current academic understandings, 
it may prove useful to explore two notions that clarify what the 
framework both does and does not purport to provide. First, the 
same underlying legal dispute may be best understood as falling 
into different outlier categories during particular moments, de-
pending on changes in the surrounding legal context. Thus, for 
instance, when the US government initially filed suit against 
Virginia for VMI’s refusal to admit women, that suit may most 
plausibly be viewed as attempting to suppress a holdout. Only 
after the state introduced VWIL as a substitute for VMI, in 
response to a lower court decision invalidating its admissions 
program, should Virginia be construed as challenging a backup. 
 
about the sexual assault of children, see generally Monica C. Bell, Grassroots Death Sen-
tences? The Social Movement for Capital Child Rape Laws, 98 J Crim L & Criminol 1 
(2007). 
 96 Kennedy, 554 US at 423. The other states that passed such laws were Georgia, 
Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. Id. 
 97 Id at 423–24. 
 98 See id at 423. 
 99 Id at 461 (Alito dissenting). 
 100 Kennedy, 554 US at 461 (Alito dissenting). 
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Second, and more importantly, it is crucial to understand 
that, even in the absence of altered context, different people may 
hold differing assessments regarding which outlier subset best 
houses a particular judicial opinion. Sorting outliers into these 
various categories constitutes an exercise in judgment and cannot 
be reduced to a mathematical equation that elicits absolutely 
correct and incorrect answers.101 Even if an overwhelming major-
ity agrees that a judicial opinion falls into one outlier category, 
such broad agreement does not necessarily mean that others are 
wrong for conceiving of the opinion as falling into a different out-
lier category. To take one example that may at first blush ap-
pear to belong inescapably in a single category, reconsider the 
Court’s opinion in Griswold. It hardly seems adventurous to 
maintain that most scholars would, if confronted with the outlier 
taxonomy, identify the Connecticut statute assessed in Griswold 
as a holdout. After all, only two states continued to regulate con-
traceptives in the marital context when the Court decided 
Griswold.102 Conceiving of Griswold as invalidating a holdout is 
not, however, the only way to construe the opinion as involving 
an outlier. Rather, the Connecticut statute, with its evidently 
unique regulatory focus on contraceptive usage (as distinct from 
distribution or possession), might also be validly understood as 
an upstart—one that no other jurisdiction ever emulated during 
its eighty-seven years of existence.103 Although it may seem far-
fetched to believe that anyone would seriously entertain the no-
tion of an octogenarian upstart, this view of Connecticut’s statute 
is far from fantastical. Indeed, perhaps the most well-known 
passage of Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Poe can be understood 
as espousing this view. When Harlan explained the decisive fac-
tor leading him to condemn Connecticut’s statute was its “utter 
novelty,” he in effect advanced the notion of an elderly upstart.104 
“Although the Federal Government and many States have at 
one time or other had on their books statutes forbidding or regu-
lating the distribution of contraceptives, none, so far as I can 
find, has made the use . . . a crime,” Harlan wrote.105 In Harlan’s 
 
 101 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 97 (Yale 
1978) (“Even when the law pretends to be a science, it is not, after all, mathematics.”). 
 102 Griswold Appellants’ Brief at *24 (cited in note 26). 
 103 See Griswold, 381 US at 480, 485–86. 
 104 Poe, 367 US at 554 (Harlan dissenting). 
 105 Id. 
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eyes, that Connecticut failed to gain even a single fellow anti-
use adherent after eight long decades sealed the statute’s fate. 
Whatever the truth of the First Amendment axiom holding 
that “one [person’s] vulgarity is another’s lyric,”106 it seems 
abundantly clear that one person’s holdout is another’s upstart. 
Disagreements over the appropriate placement of judicial opin-
ions involving various types of outliers might easily, if tediously, 
be adduced. Accordingly, the foregoing outlier taxonomy does 
not aim to achieve anything approaching universal agreement 
regarding where particular opinions should best be placed within 
each subset of outliers. Such a goal would not only make for an 
exercise in futility, but would extend into sheer folly. Neverthe-
less, disagreements about the proper designation for various out-
lier opinions should not be permitted to obscure the overarching 
point: rather than all outliers being the same, they can be sorted 
into various categories. One need not agree with the compara-
tively small-bore question of how particular decisions are catego-
rized, in other words, to appreciate the larger notion that various 
outlier categories do in fact exist. Comprehending the existence 
of those various outlier categories, as will become evident, yields 
insight into significant matters in constitutional law and consti-
tutional theory. 
II.  ANALYZING OUTLIERS 
This Part aims to challenge several scholarly mispercep-
tions that have flowed from treating the outlier notion as an un-
differentiated mass instead of several distinct entities. Contrary 
to widespread understanding, outlier-suppressing opinions can-
not all accurately be depicted as rejecting antiquated measures 
in favor of modern attitudes. Understanding the vulnerabilities of 
this modernization idea as applied to some outlier variants in turn 
complicates two prominent scholarly contentions associated with 
the judiciary’s invalidation of outliers. First, suppressing outliers 
cannot, as is sometimes suggested, invariably be viewed as dimin-
ishing judicial review’s tension with democracy; indeed, the invali-
dation of some outlier variants can be seen as only accentuating 
that tension. Second, suppressing outliers cannot, as is sometimes 
suggested, invariably be viewed as conflicting with all notions of 
federalism; indeed, at least one well-known notion of federalism 
might be understood, over time, to require the invalidation of most 
 
 106 Cohen v California, 403 US 15, 25 (1971). 
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outlier variants. In addition, awareness of the outlier varieties 
undermines scholarly assertions that outlier-suppressing opin-
ions necessarily invalidate measures that the nation regards as 
backward. Outlier measures often appear not to conflict as 
sharply with national attitudes as is commonly assumed. Finally, 
awareness of outliers’ multiplicity also casts doubt on the claim 
that invalidating outlier measures holds merely insignificant 
import for the nation’s constitutional order. This view accords an 
excessively marginal position to at least some opinions that reject 
outliers. 
A. Modernization? 
Appreciating the distinctions among outlier variants comp-
licates the temporal notions that legal scholars frequently as-
cribe to judicial opinions invalidating a small number of state 
practices. Legal scholarship too often suggests that the Court’s 
outlier-suppressing opinions, as a general proposition, reject 
practices that have already peaked and are now fading. Thus, in 
addition to Judge Easterbrook’s broad claim that outlier-
suppressing decisions reject state practices after they have “dis-
appeared or dwindled,”107 Professor Klarman has contended that 
such decisions reject “lingering outliers.”108 Professor Powe has 
similarly asserted that the Court eradicates “outmoded values”109 
when it “tak[es] on . . . anachronistic outliers.”110 Although such 
temporal references pervade the scholarly literature on constitu-
tional outliers, those statements are typically fleeting. Professor 
Strauss has, however, recently offered the most elaborate and 
articulate version of this idea, which he styles the judiciary’s 
“modernizing role.”111 When judges interpret the Constitution in 
a modernizing fashion, Strauss argues, they “treat a statute’s 
outlier status as evidence that it is archaic,” “outmoded,” and “a 
relic of an earlier time.”112 The primary distinguishing character-
istic of modernizing courts, Strauss contends, is the view that 
“the constitutionality of a statute depends in large part on 
whether the statute, although still on the books, is a product of a 
 
 107 Easterbrook, 59 U Chi L Rev at 370 (cited in note 2). 
 108 Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw U L Rev 
145, 178 (1998). 
 109 Lucas A. Powe Jr, The Warren Court and American Politics 490 (Belknap 2000). 
 110 L.A. Powe Jr, 38 Wake Forest L Rev at 719 (cited in note 3). 
 111 Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 907 (cited in note 5). 
 112 Id at 887–88. 
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bygone era and is no longer supported by a political consensus.”113 
In assessing whether current conditions have passed a statute 
by, Strauss argues that modernizing judges contemplate: 
Is there a national trend that has left this statute an out-
lier, not found in other jurisdictions—thus suggesting that 
even if the statute enjoys local support, it is out of touch 
with sentiment in the society at large, on a subject on which 
local variation is not likely to persist?114 
In the course of invalidating such outdated outliers, modernizing 
courts “look[ ] to the future, not the past,”115 and succeed in 
“bringing statutes up to date [by] anticipating changes that have 
majority support.”116 This “hostility to outliers,” Strauss main-
tains, is a core “feature of modernization.”117 
This depiction of outlier-suppressing opinions as extinguishing 
practices that time has left behind applies quite sensibly to cases 
rejecting holdouts. By the mid-1960s—when the Supreme Court 
invalidated an anticontraceptive law in Griswold, rejected poll 
taxes in Harper, and required counsel for indigent criminal de-
fendants in Gideon—many observers regarded those opinions as 
dragging a few straggling jurisdictions into constitutional mod-
ernity.118 Indeed, several justices’ opinions in that trio of cases 
expressly portrayed the decisions as invalidating anachronisms.119 
Even justices who dissented in Griswold and Harper allowed 
that the contested statutes emitted the unpleasant odor of a 
 
 113 Id at 862. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 860 (cited in note 5). 
 116 Id at 861. 
 117 Id at 864. Although he is careful to confess normative ambivalence about judicial 
modernization, Strauss nevertheless suggests that this approach accurately describes 
large swaths of current constitutional doctrine. Id at 860. 
 118 See, for example, Ernest Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Justices and Con-
necticut’s “Uncommonly Silly Law,” 42 Notre Dame L Rev 680, 694 (1967) (contending 
that judicial deference to the legislature in Griswold would be “absurd in determining 
the constitutionality of an eighty-three-year-old statute having no contemporary rele-
vance”); Editorial, Taps for the Poll Tax, NY Times 40 (Mar 25, 1966) (noting that “[t]he 
poll tax [w]as finally [ ] killed in America” when it was eliminated from the final four ju-
risdictions that retained it); William M. Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and 
Future, 49 Va L Rev 1150, 1153–54 (1963) (characterizing Gideon as “part of a wider 
movement in which the Court is turning away from the older style ‘fair trial’ rule,” and 
suggesting that “[p]erhaps the most surprising aspect of the overruling of Betts v. Brady 
is that it was so long in coming”). 
 119 See text accompanying notes 28–30, 37–38, 45–47. 
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bygone age.120 It seems probable that Gideon does not contain 
similar allowances in dissent, moreover, only because the case 
generated no dissenting opinions at all.121 
This modernization idea can also be viewed as illuminating 
the judiciary’s regulation of backups. When the Court invalidated 
the backup regimes at issue in United States v Virginia and 
Lane v Wilson, nearly every other jurisdiction had already 
abandoned all-male military academies and grandfather clauses 
before the backup states sought to reinforce those practices.122 
Accordingly, it sheds light on the underlying legal dynamic to 
view Virginia and Lane as eradicating measures that appeared 
outmoded. Virginia, virtually alone, stubbornly refused to abandon 
gender segregation of military academies; Oklahoma, literally 
alone, stubbornly refused to abandon the grandfather clause for 
voting. Although Georgia’s revival of capital punishment for 
rape presents a somewhat more complicated legal backdrop, 
Coker v Georgia can also be understood as eliminating what was 
widely regarded as an antiquated practice.123 Sixteen states 
permitted death sentences for rape when Furman invalidated 
capital punishment across the board in 1972.124 While it may be 
difficult to view a practice that existed in nearly one-third of the 
nation as obsolete, it is important to consider the legislative re-
sponse to Furman. Of the thirty-five states that scrambled to 
pass new death penalty statutes after Furman, only three of 
them aimed to include rape as a death-eligible offense, and 
Georgia stood alone in retaining capital punishment for raping 
an adult woman when the Court decided Coker.125 Under the 
modernizing theory, such mild legislative activity might persua-
sively be viewed as indicating that enthusiasm for the practice 
had subsided. 
Beyond the realm of holdouts and backups, though, the notion 
that outlier-suppressing opinions should be construed as mod-
ernizing decisions encounters considerable analytical difficulty. 
Predictably, nowhere is that analytical difficulty more pro-
nounced than within the upstart category of outliers. When the 
judiciary reins in upstarts, after all, it is not casting aside meas-
 
 120 See Griswold, 381 US at 507 (Black dissenting); Harper, 383 US at 675 (Black 
dissenting). 
 121 See Gideon, 372 US at 335–36. 
 122 See text accompanying notes 68, 87. 
 123 See text accompanying notes 80–81. 
 124 Furman, 408 US at 341. 
 125 See Coker, 433 US at 593–94, 596. 
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ures that large segments of society once embraced but have now 
rejected. Instead of attacking measures that seem to be on the 
verge of disappearing, upstart-suppressing opinions invalidate 
measures soon after they first appear. When the Court invali-
dates upstarts, thus, it may be less accurate to view such opin-
ions as modernizing than as antimodernizing. 
Consistent with this notion of antimodernization, the justices’ 
opinions rejecting upstarts in Moore, Romer, and Plyler did not 
portray the various measures under review as archaic, or some-
how disconnected from modern realities.126 Such a sell would 
have been tough, if not impossible, given that all three measures 
had been enacted within a decade of arriving at the Court. In 
the shortest timeframe, not even four full years had elapsed be-
tween Colorado’s passage of Amendment 2 and the Court’s opin-
ion in Romer.127 Rather than awkwardly depicting upstart 
measures as outmoded, the justices instead moved decisively in 
the opposite direction—casting their opinions, in various ways, 
as efforts to restore a status quo that the new measures threat-
ened. Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Moore strikes this 
theme with perhaps the greatest force. Not only does Powell 
concede that East Cleveland’s housing ordinance can be under-
stood as responding to modernity, but he goes further by por-
traying the decision as a defense of old-fashioned values. “Even 
if conditions of modern society have brought about a decline in 
extended family households,” Powell wrote, “they have not 
erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the 
centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports a 
larger conception of the family.”128 Echoing some of these 
themes, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Romer por-
trayed Amendment 2 as an assault on “our constitutional tradi-
tion” and construed the decision as forestalling the “[s]weeping 
and comprehensive . . . change in legal status effected by this 
law.”129 Moore and Romer may thus be characterized as united in 
 
 126 But see Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 881–82 (cited in note 5) (construing Moore as 
invalidating an outlier statute and the Court’s decision as modernizing); Klarman, 93 
Nw U L Rev at 178 (cited in note 108) (contending broadly that the Court’s outlier-
suppressing opinions reject “lingering outliers,” after identifying Moore and Plyler as 
outliers); Klarman, 89 Cal L Rev at 1749 (cited in note 8) (identifying Moore, Plyler, and 
Romer as outliers alongside Griswold and Harper). 
 127 Romer, 517 US at 623. 
 128 Moore, 431 US at 505 (Powell) (plurality). 
 129 Romer, 517 US at 627, 633. 
  
2014] Constitutional Outliers 955 
 
attempting to ensure continuity with the past, and evincing sus-
picion of newfangled measures that depart from tradition. 
In Plyler, the justices who voted to invalidate the Texas 
statute did not contend that the measure sprung from some well 
of archaic anti-immigrant sentiment. Rather, they portrayed the 
measure as being all too consonant with current frustrations 
over unauthorized immigration and the federal government’s 
failure to address the matter.130 Unlike Moore and Romer, 
though, the decision in Plyler was justified not by a backward-
looking focus on tradition and the statute’s rupturing of that 
tradition. To the contrary, Plyler was substantially a forward-
looking opinion, though not in the way that modernizing theo-
rists might posit. The Court did not issue Plyler, in other words, 
because it anticipated that emerging attitudes toward unauthor-
ized immigration would soon render the Texas statute an anach-
ronism. Instead, the result in Plyler stemmed from a desire to 
avoid realizing the dystopian future that would result from af-
firming the statute. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan ex-
plained: “This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste 
of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain 
here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the bene-
fits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful resi-
dents.”131 Powell’s concurring opinion amplified this theme. 
“These children . . . have been singled out for a lifelong penalty 
and stigma,” Powell wrote.132 “A legislative classification that 
threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens and 
residents cannot be reconciled with one of the fundamental pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”133 
Turning away from upstarts, it also seems misguided to 
construe the Court’s invalidation of the throwback regime in 
Kennedy as an opinion that “modernized” attitudes toward capi-
tal punishment for raping children.134 Not only had six states 
adopted measures permitting the death penalty for child rape 
 
 130 See Plyler, 457 US at 228 (noting the assertion that the law at issue was justified 
by the need to stem the tide of unauthorized immigration); id at 237 (Powell concurring) 
(lamenting Congress’s lack of leadership in dealing with the problem of unauthorized 
immigration). 
 131 Id at 218–19 (majority). 
 132 Id at 238–39 (Powell concurring). 
 133 Id at 239 (Powell concurring). 
 134 For an example of the modernizing position, see Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 865 
(cited in note 5) (construing Kennedy as invalidating an outlier statute and the Court’s 
decision as modernizing). 
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between 1995 and 2007, but three of these states joined the 
group during the two years preceding Kennedy.135 These states—
and several others that contemplated similar laws in the period 
leading up to Kennedy—were responding to a rising tide of public 
concern over sexual assaults against children.136 Shortly after 
Kennedy, moreover, it became clear that the briefs filed in the 
case and the Court’s opinion overlooked that Congress had in 
2006—a mere two years earlier—enacted federal legislation that 
made military personnel convicted of raping a child eligible for 
capital punishment.137 It is extraordinarily difficult, thus, to 
view laws permitting capital punishment for child rape in 2008 
as relics from a bygone age. Indeed, if any aspect of Kennedy 
conflicted with modern attitudes, it may be more accurate to 
portray the Court’s opinion itself as an anachronism rather than 
the statutes it invalidated. 
1. Countermajoritarianism. 
Understanding how modernization cannot account for all 
varieties of outlier-suppressing opinions challenges scholarly 
claims of how the Court’s invalidation of outliers implicates the 
relationship between democracy and judicial review. At least 
since Professor Alexander Bickel coined the term “counter-
majoritarian difficulty,” constitutional law professors have dedi-
cated considerable energy to wrestling with the fundamental 
question of how a nation that fancies itself a democracy can 
permit a bare majority of nine unelected justices to set aside legis-
lation enacted by popularly elected officials.138 Several scholars 
in recent years have argued that the apparent tension between 
 
 135 See Kennedy, 554 US at 423 (noting that South Carolina and Oklahoma joined 
the group in 2006, and Texas followed suit in 2007). 
 136 See, for example, Bell, 98 J Crim L & Criminol at 16–17 (cited in note 95) (suggesting 
that the media fascination with the stories of Megan Kanka and Jessica Lunsford—two 
children who were raped and murdered—helped to make people in this era receptive to 
capital child-rape legislation). 
 137 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 § 552(b), Pub L No 
109-163, 119 Stat 3136, 3263. 
 138 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics 16–23 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962). For a particularly important work that 
can be understood as grappling with Bickel’s difficulty, see generally Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust (cited in note 15). Bickel coined the term countermajoritarian difficulty; he did 
not, of course, discover the underlying concept. For relatively early adumbrations of the 
concept, see generally James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv L Rev 129 (1893). For a sophisticated treatment 
building on Thayer’s skepticism of judicial review, see Adrian Vermeule, Judging under 
Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 230–89 (Harvard 2006). 
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democracy and judicial review is more illusory than real, at least 
when one traces the actual contours of that relationship.139 The 
countermajoritarian difficulty, these scholars claim, proves upon 
sufficiently close inspection to be not all that difficult. Strauss 
has suggested that the Court’s modernizing opinions may in 
part stem from an effort to make the practice of judicial review 
more compatible with democracy. “Perhaps in response to the re-
lentless criticism of judicial review as antidemocratic, the courts 
have, both consciously and unconsciously, shaped constitutional 
law so as to reduce the degree of confrontation between the judi-
ciary and the elected branches,” Strauss contends.140 “If the 
courts are doing no more than bringing statutes up to date, and 
anticipating changes that have majority support . . . then judi-
cial review has, in principle, a more comfortable place in democ-
ratic government.”141 When the judiciary rejects an outlier insti-
tution, Strauss argues, its opinion “suggests that popular 
sentiment may no longer support the institution, and that a 
decision invalidating it will reinforce, not defeat, the democratic 
process.”142 
The idea that invalidating outlier practices alleviates judi-
cial review’s tension with democracy must be examined through 
the lens of public sentiment on two different levels: the state and 
the national. On the state level, the notion that invalidating out-
lier practices relieves the countermajoritarian difficulty possesses 
explanatory appeal for at least some holdouts, but it appears to 
possess far less force for the remaining three outlier variants. To 
take the most glaring example, the holdout measure at issue in 
Griswold dated back nearly one century.143 It seems plausible 
that when the Court invalidated the measure, it could no longer 
garner popular support even within the confines of Connecticut. 
Thus, in 1966, Connecticut’s extreme anticontraceptive statute 
may have remained on the books, but there are plenty of reasons 
 
 139 See, for example, Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has 
Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 4–9 (Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux 2009). For a critique of Friedman’s approach, see Justin Driver, Why 
Law Should Lead, New Republic 28 (Apr 8, 2010). 
 140 Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 861 (cited in note 5). 
 141 Id. 
 142 David A. Strauss, Modernization and Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in 
Memory of John Hart Ely, 57 Stan L Rev 761, 768 (2004). 
 143 Griswold, 381 US at 527 (Stewart dissenting) (“Since 1879 Connecticut has had 
on its books a law which forbids the use of contraceptives by anyone.”). 
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to believe that it did not reflect sentiment in the streets.144 The 
inability to overturn existing legislation should not, of course, be 
confused with affirmative support for that legislation.145 To the 
extent that the judiciary’s invalidation of holdout measures can 
accurately be understood as implementing the views of current 
democratic majorities that—for whatever reason—cannot be imp-
lemented through local politics, such opinions might be viewed 
as less in tension with democracy. 
When one pivots away from Griswold’s invalidation of a 
holdout and examines other types of outliers, however, the ten-
sion between democracy and the judiciary’s invalidation of even 
a small number of state practices becomes more apparent. When 
judges invalidate upstarts, backups, and throwbacks, they can-
not typically claim that the invalidated measures simply embody 
the views of generations past and do not represent current atti-
tudes within the jurisdiction. With all three nonholdout variants 
of outliers, some entity within the state has made clear that it 
prefers the policy that the judiciary subsequently invalidates. 
On the local level, it is difficult to dismiss such policies as the 
voices of those who are dead and gone when they are uttered by 
people from the here and now. In its not-so-distant past, the up-
start has innovated, the backup has reaffirmed, and the throw-
back has reintroduced. If one assumes that the state level is at 
times the appropriate locus for decisionmaking authority, then 
judicial decisions that set aside recently enacted upstarts, back-
ups, and throwbacks do not seem to alleviate judicial review’s 
pinch on democracy.146 If anything, they seem to accentuate it. 
Turning from the state to the national level, it is certainly 
true that outlier-suppressing opinions do not invalidate meas-
ures found in a majority of states. Extrapolating from this point, 
some legal scholars come perilously close to positing that be-
cause outlier measures exist in only a few jurisdictions, such 
measures must not enjoy majority support on a national scale. 
 
 144 See, for example, Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality at 256 (cited in note 27) (observing 
that the Catholic hierarchy in Connecticut considered the statute a “bad one because it 
was unenforceable”). 
 145 See Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical 
Introduction 106 (Chicago 1991) (observing that statutes are “hard to amend or repeal” 
and, “[c]onsequently, a statute may stay on the books indefinitely even though it has be-
come out of step with current public policy”). 
 146 See Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 S 
Ct Rev 103, 151–52 (criticizing majoritarian scholars for ignoring state decisionmaking 
authority). 
  
2014] Constitutional Outliers 959 
 
Klarman has written: “Historically, the justices, perhaps com-
prehending the risk [of issuing unpopular decisions], generally 
have used the Constitution to suppress outlier state practices. 
Such decisions are, almost by definition, likely to generate support 
among national majorities.”147 In suggesting that, even if local ma-
jorities condemn outlier-suppressing opinions, national majorities 
will still almost certainly applaud them, this notion has the effect 
of minimizing Bickel’s countermajoritarian difficulty. 
Yet it is far from clear that laws and practices found in only 
a small number of states should be taken to indicate that nation-
wide majorities currently oppose the measures. The potential 
discrepancy between state practices and national popular sup-
port may be most readily grasped in the context of opinions that 
invalidate upstarts and throwbacks. Even if majorities in all fifty 
states favored the underlying measures, lags often exist between 
when such support materializes and when the support trans-
lates into legislation—assuming that it ever does so. If the Su-
preme Court eliminates upstarts and throwbacks found in a 
small number of states before they enjoy an opportunity to 
spread widely, it may well invalidate what, in the absence of ju-
dicial intervention, would have become a dominant practice. 
This point that laws and practices found in only a few states 
may conceal broad public support is not exclusively a law profes-
sor’s hypothetical. Rather, the point finds some support in poll-
ing data concerning measures in outlier-suppressing opinions. In 
the wake of the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the throwback 
measure in Kennedy, for instance, 55 percent of respondents to a 
national public opinion poll supported capital punishment for 
child rape and only 38 percent opposed it.148 Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees in 
2008—Senators Barack Obama and John McCain—appeared to 
concur with majority sentiment, as the candidates immediately 
denounced Kennedy for rejecting capital punishment in the 
context of what they both called a “heinous” crime.149 Similarly, 
although no public opinion polling gauged contemporaneous re-
action to the Court’s decision invalidating the upstart measure 
 
 147 Klarman, 89 Cal L Rev at 1749 (cited in note 8). 
 148 Quinnipiac University, American Voters Oppose Same-Sex Marriage (July 17, 
2008), online at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/polling-institute/national/ 
release-detail?ReleaseID=1194 (visited Aug 12, 2014). 
 149 Linda Greenhouse, Execution Ruled Out, 5-4, If Life Isn’t Taken, NY Times A1, 
A19 (June 26, 2008). 
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in Plyler, it hardly seems implausible to maintain that a na-
tional majority may have supported Texas’s upstart effort to ex-
clude unauthorized immigrants from public schools. Two years 
after Plyler, a Gallup poll determined that 55 percent of the pub-
lic deemed unauthorized immigration a “very important” prob-
lem, and respondents in states bordering Mexico expressed that 
view only slightly more frequently than citizens in other 
states.150 In May 1995, when Gallup conducted the first nation-
wide poll asking respondents whether they favored or opposed 
“providing free public education, school lunches, and other bene-
fits to the children of” unauthorized immigrants, 67 percent ex-
pressed opposition and only 28 percent expressed support.151 It 
seems mistaken, then, to construe opinions rejecting outliers as 
almost definitionally finding support among national majorities. 
None of the foregoing should be taken as suggesting that the 
Supreme Court should avoid invalidating outlier practices be-
cause of these potential strains on democracy. Sometimes, the 
Court must issue decisions that contravene majority preferences 
in order to fulfill its constitutional role.152 But when judges in-
validate outliers, they should not delude themselves into think-
ing that their opinions invariably display democracy’s imprima-
tur. On the state level, most variants of outlier-suppressing 
opinions cannot accurately be viewed as disabling statutes that 
no longer enjoy support in the modern world. To the contrary, 
the nonholdout outlier variants typically involve measures that 
have recently been endorsed by current constituencies. On the 
national level, moreover, it is mistaken to believe that outlier 
measures—almost by necessity—do not currently enjoy majority 
support throughout the nation. The countermajoritarian diffi-
culty, even if the matter is elevated to the national level, would 
seem to retain some of its thorns after all. 
 
 150 See Tom Morganthau, et al, Closing the Door?, Newsweek 18, 20 (June 25, 1984) 
(reporting that “residents of states along the Mexican border are only slightly more likely 
. . . to call the problem ‘very important’” than citizens nationally). 
 151 Stanley Elam and Lowell C. Rose, Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public’s 
Attitudes toward the Public Schools, 77 Phi Delta Kappan 41, 52 (1995). 
 152 See West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 638 (1943) 
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2. Federalism. 
These temporal considerations similarly complicate domi-
nant readings of the relationship between outlier-suppressing 
opinions and notions of federalism. Some scholars have suggested 
that the relationship between outlier suppression and federal-
ism is almost inherently a hostile one.153 When judicial opinions 
interpret the Constitution to suppress outliers, scholars note, 
those opinions impose national uniformity and undercut state 
autonomy, thus impinging on what they regard as the very 
hallmark of federalism. Yet just as it is crucial to remember that 
not all outliers are relics in need of modernization, the same ob-
servation holds for theories of federalism.154 By examining the 
outlier variants through various federalism lenses, it becomes 
possible to see that scholars should not view outlier-suppressing 
opinions as colliding with all federalism ideals with equivalent 
force. 
To be sure, the notion that outlier-suppressing opinions 
clash with federalism contains some explanatory power—at 
least as applied to certain notions of federalism. If one values 
federalism primarily because it permits different states to arrive 
at different solutions, outlier-suppressing opinions typically 
should be viewed as clashing with federalism.155 New York and 
Florida are extremely different states, this state-autonomy version 
of federalism runs, and courts should not force them to follow 
precisely the same rules. Under a related theory, to the extent 
that one values federalism primarily because it permits people 
to relocate from one state to a different state whose policies bet-
ter reflect their values, outlier-suppressing opinions also should 
generally be seen as disrespecting federalism.156 Under this 
competitive-federalism theory, for instance, New Yorkers who 
object to state income taxes may decide to express that policy 
 
 153 See, for example, Powe, The Warren Court at 494 (cited in note 109) (contending 
that outlier-suppressing opinions eradicate respect for federalism); Easterbrook, 59 U 
Chi L Rev at 370 (cited in note 2) (contending that outlier-suppressing opinions violate 
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 154 See Michael S. Greve, The Upside-Down Constitution 4 (Harvard 2012) (observing 
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 155 See Michael W. McConnell, Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U Chi L Rev 
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preference by relocating to Florida, a state that eschews income 
taxation.157 Both of these federalism theories stand in considerable 
tension with judicial opinions that suppress all outlier variants 
because the theories are predicated on maintaining and permit-
ting the existence of diverse measures that satisfy people with 
diverse preferences. Such state diversity seems plainly incom-
patible with outlier-suppressing opinions. 
Yet not all theories of federalism are predicated on main-
taining diverse approaches within states across all points in 
time. The federalism theory that Justice Louis Brandeis es-
poused in New State Ice Co v Liebmann158—which portrayed 
states as laboratories of experimentation—is often understood 
as rejecting the idea that federalism necessarily entails fostering 
a diverse set of state approaches in perpetuity.159 For Brandeis, a 
diverse set of state approaches to answering particular ques-
tions was a temporary, rather than a permanent, feature of fed-
eralism. Consistent with the scientific metaphor of experimenta-
tion, Brandeis’s conception of federalism implicitly views states 
as attempting to discover a single “correct” policy.160 After the 
various state experiments yield evidence and it becomes apparent 
which policy best addresses a problem, Brandeis’s version of fed-
eralism assumes that all states will eventually adopt the policy.161 
Thus, following a period of permitting decentralized approaches, 
the laboratories of experimentation would ultimately be ex-
pected to produce a uniform approach. 
Adherents to this Brandeisian conception of federalism can 
be understood as harboring quite distinct attitudes toward dif-
ferent outlier-suppressing opinions, depending on the particular 
type of outlier that the judiciary attacks. In the context of out-
liers, Brandeis’s language from New State Ice warrants extended 
scrutiny because it makes clear that he was most concerned with 
judicial invalidations of one particular type of outlier: 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a 
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may 
 
 157 Instead of voting with their feet, New Yorkers might also express that policy 
preference by attempting to have New York change its law. See generally Albert O. 
Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States (Harvard 1970). 
 158 285 US 262 (1932). 
 159 Id at 311 (Brandeis dissenting). 
 160 Edward A. Purcell Jr, Evolving Understandings of American Federalism: Some 
Shifting Parameters, 50 NY L Sch L Rev 635, 673 (2006). 
 161 See id. 
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be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one 
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labo-
ratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power 
to prevent an experiment. . . . But in the exercise of this 
high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our 
prejudices into legal principles.162 
Here, when Brandeis extols the ability of states to depart from a 
uniform approach and try something “novel,” he can best be under-
stood as counseling skepticism of outlier-suppressing opinions 
that invalidate upstarts. After all, when the Court invalidates 
an upstart measure, it precludes an experiment from getting off 
the ground and effectively freezes the status quo in place. 
Eliminating an upstart could have deleterious consequences for 
the nation, in Brandeis’s estimation, because it thwarts the kind 
of trial-and-error process that may eventually lead states 
throughout the nation to adopt what was once a genuinely novel 
approach.163 Brandeis’s theoretical aversion to upstart-
suppressing opinions seems unmistakable. 
It is far less clear, however, that Brandeis’s federalism theory 
would be equally offended by judicial opinions that rein in 
nonupstart types of outliers. The Brandeisian conception of fed-
eralism may evince the least skepticism toward a judicial opin-
ion that invalidates a holdout. If many states have independ-
ently rejected an approach that was once popular and only a few 
states continue with the old model, Brandeisians might plausi-
bly view that trend as evidence that the experiment has run its 
course and construe the holdout states as offering merely an an-
tiquated, “incorrect” answer to a policy question. The laboratory 
notion of federalism might view a backup-suppressing opinion in 
much the same way. With backups and holdouts alike, states 
can be regarded not as embarking on some novel approach, but 
only attempting to preserve a model that has been widely dis-
carded as inferior. Yet it is possible that the Brandeisian might 
regard the backup as importantly distinct from the holdout: if 
the backup measure is regarded as sufficiently distinct from its 
predecessor so as in effect to inaugurate a new experiment, then 
 
 162 New State Ice, 285 US at 311 (Brandeis dissenting). 
 163 See id at 310 (Brandeis dissenting) (“The discoveries in physical science, the tri-
umphs in invention, attest the value of the process of trial and error. In large measure, 
these advances have been due to experimentation.”). 
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the Brandeisian would be extremely reluctant to invalidate the 
backup measure. Finally, with throwback measures, it seems 
likely that Brandeis would regard states as attempting to revive 
a policy solution that has already been widely deemed inferior. 
But, as with holdouts, a caveat applies: if the throwback meas-
ure in question is regarded as sufficiently distinct from the 
measures of the earlier era that it constitutes an altogether new 
experiment, then the Brandeisian would seek to avoid invalidating 
the measure in its infancy. 
The claim here is, thus, not that jurists committed to advanc-
ing a Brandeisian conception of federalism would invariably 
uphold state measures that were upstarts and invariably invali-
date state measures involving all three remaining outlier variants. 
No statement so unequivocal can even remotely be supported. 
Brandeis himself, in voting to invalidate Oregon’s upstart legis-
lation requiring public school attendance in Pierce v Society of 
Sisters,164 demonstrated that his willingness to indulge what he 
must have regarded as ill-conceived experimentation was not 
limitless.165 Still, it is important to understand that Brandeisian 
federalism admonishes judges to be particularly aware of the 
heightened hazards that accompany the judiciary’s invalidation 
of upstarts. At a minimum, it seems safe to say that outlier-
suppressing opinions invalidating holdouts, backups, and 
throwbacks generally pose less acute problems for Brandeisian 
notions of federalism. It may not even be too much to suggest 
that such opinions sometimes actually advance Brandeisian fed-
eralism, given that they can be construed as extending the “cor-
rect” answer to states that are slow to heed the lessons provided 
by the laboratories. In all events, though, broad statements 
about the acrimonious relationship between outlier-suppressing 
opinions and federalism should give way to accounts that allow 
for finer gradations. 
 
 164 268 US 510 (1925). 
 165 Intriguingly, some Catholic leaders perceived the Oregon public school statute at 
issue in Pierce as an opening salvo that portended virulent anti-Catholic legislation 
across the nation. See generally Oregon’s Outlawing of Church Schools, Literary Digest 
34 (Jan 6, 1923). If this interpretation is possibly accurate, it suggests that the Court’s 
opinion in Pierce contained broader significance than some outlier-minded theorists have 
allowed. 
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B. Backwardness? 
Related to this modernization theory, scholars have sug-
gested that outlier statutes embody values that the nation col-
lectively deems “different” or “backward,” and that the Court’s 
opinions rejecting such outliers impose “national values” in 
flushing out these “backwaters.”166 On this view, the Court’s 
outlier-suppressing opinions identify the troglodytes in our 
midst and effectively force them to see the light. But viewing 
outliers as invariably disconnected from the country at large is 
misleading because it may offer an unduly sanguine conception 
of the attitudes that exist within the larger nation. This sharp 
delineation of states—and even whole regions of the country—
into camps of the enlightened and the unenlightened may do a 
poor job of capturing complex realities on the ground. A local at-
titude commonly dismissed as backward and outré may some-
times be less distinct from the whole than is initially assumed. 
Referring to a particular measure as an outlier should not be 
taken to mean that the larger society contains either no, or only 
scant, traces of the animating viewpoint. 
In analyzing the outlier-as-backwater framework, students 
of law might learn something from statistics, the field from 
which legal scholars have imported the term outlier. When stat-
isticians encounter a datum that they consider an outlier, they 
 
 166 Powe’s scholarship features this theme prominently. See Powe, The Warren 
Court at 376 (cited in note 109) (contending that Griswold rejected laws in Connecticut 
and “its backward cousins”); id at 492 (suggesting that outlier-suppressing opinions 
“bring[ ] backwaters into the mainstream”). See also L.A. Powe Jr, Does Footnote Four 
Describe?, 11 Const Commen 197, 197 (1994) (contending that the Court’s decisions be-
tween 1938 and 1973 “create[d] a set of national norms [and] eradicat[ed] in the process 
that which was different or backward”); id at 210 (contending that the Court’s opinions 
rejected “what was different—backward”); L.A. Powe Jr, Book Review, Are “the People” 
Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 Tex L Rev 855, 888 (2005) (contending 
that the Court’s outlier-suppressing opinions impose “national values”). But Powe’s 
scholarship is not the only work that articulates such notions. See, for example, Tushnet, 
Why the Constitution Matters at 100 (cited in note 3) (contending that outlier-
suppressing opinions might be understood as imposing national ideas on “backwater[ ]” 
practices); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John 
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 Yale L J 1037, 1042–43 (1980) (contending that 
Moore invalidated “backwater[ ]” ideas). Klarman’s generalized claim that outlier-
suppressing opinions check “recalcitrant” states can be viewed as sounding a similar 
theme. See, for example, Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Back-
lash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage ix (Oxford 2013) (“Sometimes courts take 
dominant social mores, convert them into constitutional commands, and then use them 
to suppress outlier practices in a few recalcitrant states.”). The term “recalcitrant” seems 
to apply most readily to backup measures, but would seem to be an inapposite term for 
other outlier variants. 
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do not automatically reject it out of hand. Instead, they some-
times scrutinize the datum in an effort to understand what, if 
anything, the isolated value signals about the larger data set.167 
In that same spirit, legal scholars might do well to contemplate 
what, if anything, an outlier signals about the larger nation. 
Sometimes, upon close inspection, legal scholars may conclude 
that the outlier signals nothing particularly meaningful about 
the country as a whole. But other times, perhaps even most 
times, legal scholars may determine that the jurisdictional out-
lier, while certainly representing a noteworthy point in the data, 
is not completely aberrant from the remainder of the nation. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Romer may offer the most 
compelling evidence of how the outlier-as-backwater theory 
sometimes obscures more than it clarifies. Legal scholars have 
routinely labeled Colorado’s upstart Amendment 2 measure not 
merely an outlier but have also called it “extreme,” “highly 
unusual,” and “an obvious outlier.”168 These descriptions are not 
inaccurate; Colorado truly did tread where no state had previ-
ously trod. But such descriptions also seem incomplete, as they 
fail to address precisely why this measure first appeared in Colo-
rado. Without elaboration, such terms may give readers the mis-
impression that Colorado contained unusually backward antigay 
attitudes that manifested themselves in the statewide referen-
dum. Professor Eskridge has offered perhaps the most overt por-
trayal of Colorado as a backwater on matters of sexual orienta-
tion. Romer, in Eskridge’s estimation, is best understood 
alongside Griswold’s rejection of the Connecticut holdout statute 
and Virginia’s invalidation of the effort to back up VMI.169 Each 
of those opinions, he argues, illustrates the Supreme Court’s 
penchant for targeting “easy kill[s]” that merely reject “outlier 
laws” lacking national support.170 According to Eskridge, the 
 
 167 See Robert M. Lawless, Jennifer K. Robbennolt, and Thomas S. Ulen, Empirical 
Methods in Law 222 (Aspen 2010) (“[O]utliers should not always be viewed simply as 
annoyances or as problematic data that need to be corrected. In some instances, the 
identification of outliers can be a discovery that is worth examining further.”). 
 168 Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters at 140 (cited in note 3) (“No state had a 
measure as extreme as Colorado’s in its denial of protection to gays and lesbians.”); Sun-
stein, 122 Harv L Rev at 263 (cited in note 3) (contending that Romer “str[uck] down a 
highly unusual Colorado state constitutional amendment” and asserting that Romer was 
one of many instances in which the Court “insist[s] that states must obey a national con-
sensus”); Michael J. Klarman, Book Review, Rethinking the History of American Freedom, 
42 Wm & Mary L Rev 265, 281 n 79 (2000) (calling Amendment 2 “an obvious outlier”). 
 169 See Eskridge, 100 Mich L Rev at 2372 n 1436 (cited in note 3). 
 170 Id. 
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Supreme Court shrinks from issuing opinions that protect minority 
rights when doing so may prove unpopular, a tendency that led 
it to trail national attitudes before offering any judicial protec-
tion for sexual minorities.171 When the Supreme Court finally is-
sued Romer, what Eskridge in 1999 called “[a]bout the only sig-
nificant progay decision the Supreme Court has ever handed 
down,” the opinion simply invalidated a measure from “a small-
population, outlier state and after an incendiary antigay 
campaign.”172 
This account of Colorado as a “small-population” state with 
backward attitudes on sexual orientation seems hard to square 
with reality. Colorado was the twenty-sixth-most-populous state 
in the nation, according to the 1990 census.173 Nor was Color-
ado’s campaign “incendiary,” at least as assessed by contempo-
rary standards. To the contrary, legal commentary following the 
passage of Amendment 2 expressly lamented that “the Colorado 
campaign’s more muted emphasis” enabled it to be more effec-
tive than the vitriolic approach taken by a campaign in Oregon 
during the same year.174 
It similarly strains credulity to maintain that Colorado en-
acted Amendment 2 because the state harbored citizens with 
outlandish views on sexual orientation when compared to the 
nation as a whole. During the mid-1990s, the nation seemed to 
best be characterized as closely divided, and even ambivalent, on 
the question of what legal rights should be extended to gays and 
lesbians. It is important to remember, for instance, that when 
the Court decided Romer, more than twenty states still had anti-
sodomy statutes on the books.175 Colorado was not among them; 
in 1971 it became among the first states to jettison its antisodomy 
law.176 This ambivalence may most readily be captured, however, 
 
 171 Id at 2372. 
 172 Id at 2372 n 1436. 
 173 US Census Bureau, Population Change and Distribution: 1990 to 2000, *2 (Apr 
2001), online at http://census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-2.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014). 
 174 Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Dis-
course of Equivalents, 29 Harv CR–CL L Rev 283, 289–90 (1994). 
 175 See Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality at 725 (cited in note 27). 
 176 See Romer, 517 US at 645 (Scalia dissenting). The spur for Colorado to abandon 
its antisodomy statute in 1971 was not necessarily enlightened views on gay equality, 
but rather its adoption of the Model Penal Code (MPC), which did not include a statute 
prohibiting sodomy between consenting adults. But even if the initial motivation for los-
ing the antisodomy statute was mundane, Colorado’s decision to make sure it stayed lost 
is noteworthy. After all, approximately half of the states that revised their laws based on 
the MPC during this era either expressly retained their antisodomy provisions or later 
  
968  The University of Chicago Law Review [81:929 
   
by public opinion data.177 Depending on how questions about the 
issue were framed, responses demonstrated volatile swings. Ac-
cording to a Newsweek poll taken in Romer’s wake, 84 percent of 
respondents indicated homosexuals should receive equal job op-
portunities.178 That incredibly high percentage might be taken to 
suggest that the Colorado voters who supported Amendment 2 
held views on sexual orientation that contradicted the views 
held by overwhelming percentages of Americans. Yet the further 
one delves into this poll, the murkier the picture becomes. 
Although 73 percent of respondents acknowledged that homo-
sexuals faced discrimination, for instance, “only 27 percent be-
lieve[d] more effort [was] needed to protect homosexual 
rights.”179 In response to a polling question asking whether there 
should be “special legislation” guaranteeing equal rights for 
homosexuals, moreover, a mere 52 percent of respondents indi-
cated that such laws should not exist.180 This figure is almost 
identical to the 53 percent of Coloradans who supported 
Amendment 2, which its backers framed as denying “special 
rights” on the basis of sexual orientation.181 One should, of course, 
 
reinstated them. See Ellen Ann Andersen, Out of the Closets & into the Courts: Legal 
Opportunity Structure and Gay Rights Litigation 63, 72–73 (Michigan 2005). That Colo-
rado declined to do so made it a relatively progressive state on such matters. 
 177 This ambivalence is also revealed in Romer’s amicus briefs. To be sure, seven 
states—Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington—
and the District of Columbia joined an amicus brief arguing that Amendment 2 violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Brief of Amici Curiae States of Oregon, et al, Supporting 
Respondents, Romer v Evans, Docket No 94-1039, *1–5 (US filed June 19, 1995) 
(available on Westlaw at 1995 WL 17008441). But seven states—Alabama, California, 
Idaho, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia—also joined an amicus 
brief arguing that Amendment 2 should be affirmed in the Supreme Court. Brief of Amici 
Curiae States of Alabama, et al, in Support of Petitioner, Romer v Evans, Docket No 94-
1039, *1–6 (US filed Apr 21, 1995) (available on Westlaw at 1995 WL 17008426). Not all 
of those states can be dismissed as hotbeds of homophobia. Indeed, California, Nebraska, 
and South Dakota no longer had antisodomy provisions on the books in 1996. Some may 
suspect that the pro–Amendment 2 amicus brief was framed at a high level of generality 
and simply affirmed the legitimacy of statewide popular referenda. But the brief went 
further, expressly contending that Amendment 2 did not run afoul of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause or any other constitutional provision. Id at *11–17. 
 178 David A. Kaplan and Daniel Klaidman, A Battle, Not the War, Newsweek 24, 29 
(June 3, 1996). 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. As the accompanying Newsweek article explained, “The majority does not 
support legislation guaranteeing equal rights for gays—the kind of measures Coloradans 
are now free to adopt.” Id. 
 181 Leading Cases, 110 Harv L Rev 135, 156–57 (1996). Will Perkins of Colorado for 
Family Values, which backed Amendment 2, stated: “Our objectives have never been to 
discriminate. . . . Our position is that sexual orientation is not an acceptable criterion for 
special rights.” Dirk Johnson, Colorado Homosexuals Feel Betrayed, NY Times 39 (Nov 8, 
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avoid placing too much stock in polling results. Nevertheless, 
when Amendment 2 is placed within the context of the larger 
nation, it seems inaccurate to depict Colorado’s views on sexual 
orientation as unusually retrograde. Instead, it seems closer to 
the mark to view the state as a microcosm of the nation. 
A more convincing explanation for the upstart status of 
Amendment 2 may concentrate less on the unusual nature of 
Coloradans’ antigay sentiment, and more on the state’s particu-
lar political realities. In addition to its lengthy and extensive 
history of passing statewide referenda through popular sover-
eignty, it risks only mild exaggeration to view Colorado as con-
taining a few extremely liberal islands surrounded by a sea of 
conservatism.182 In other words, the reason Mississippi, say, did 
not enact a version of Amendment 2 is not because its residents 
held more progressive views on sexual orientation than Colo-
radans. They almost certainly did not.183 Instead, Mississippi 
lacked an Amendment 2 because residents of Biloxi, Gulfport, 
and Jackson held less progressive views on sexual orientation 
than residents of Aspen, Boulder, and Denver. Even as Romer 
begins to approach its twentieth anniversary, not a single locality 
in Mississippi protects employees against discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. Repealing antidiscrimination laws 
for gays and lesbians was evidently not on the legislative agenda 
in Mississippi—and many other states—because local antidis-
crimination laws did not exist to be repealed. 
One reason for this common misperception that the Court’s 
invalidation of outliers involves backwater statutes may stem 
from the long shadow that Griswold casts over the phenomenon 
of constitutional outliers. Professor Whittington has accurately 
written: “Of course, the classic instance of regime enforcement 
against state outliers came in Griswold v. Connecticut, where 
 
1992). Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Romer advanced a version of this idea: “The 
people of Colorado have adopted an entirely reasonable provision which does not even 
disfavor homosexuals in any substantive sense, but merely denies them preferential 
treatment.” Romer, 517 US at 653 (Scalia dissenting). For an incisive account of how 
proponents of antigay measures became more sophisticated over time, particularly in 
reframing their measures as merely opposing “special rights,” see Schacter, 29 Harv CR–
CL L Rev at 302 (cited in note 174). 
 182 See Johnson, Colorado Homosexuals Feel Betrayed at 39 (cited in note 181) (not-
ing that Amendment 2 “was rejected soundly in Denver, Boulder, and Aspen[,] [b]ut it 
passed in most suburbs and rural communities”). 
 183 See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Lax, and Justin Phillips, Over Time, a Gay Marriage 
Groundswell, NY Times WK3 (Aug 22, 2010) (observing that among the fifty states Mis-
sissippi has had relatively low support for same-sex marriage). 
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the Court articulated a new constitutional right to privacy in or-
der to strike down Connecticut’s unique and rarely enforced ban 
on contraceptives.”184 Whittington’s opening two words here are, 
of course, instructive. Legal scholars often treat Griswold as the 
paradigmatic instance of a judicial opinion invalidating an outlier 
statute.185 Indeed, when legal scholars list various Supreme 
Court decisions that have suppressed outliers, they occasionally 
begin with Griswold—even though the opinion arrives first in 
neither alphabetical nor chronological order.186 When it comes to 
constitutional outliers, then, it seems that Griswold is literally 
first among equals. 
Griswold’s taking pride of place among outlier-suppressing 
opinions is at once understandable and regrettable. It is under-
standable because, viewed in isolation, the Connecticut statute’s 
one-of-a-kind status appears the very apotheosis of the outlier 
phenomenon and does so in a particularly arresting context. 
That any statewide statute prohibited the use of contraceptives 
during the mid-1960s, let alone among married couples, under-
standably strikes many observers as the epitome of a statute 
that seemed well outside the mainstream. Griswold’s eminent 
position among outlier-suppressing opinions is clinched by its 
doctrinal connection to Roe v Wade,187 which serves to elevate 
the opinion in modern constitutional controversy to a height that 
no other decision involving outliers can surpass. But Griswold’s 
looming presence over the entirety of constitutional outliers is 
regrettable because it seems to have helped instill a distorted 
scholarly understanding of the broader outlier phenomenon. Al-
though Griswold may present, in Professor Amar’s terms, “the 
most illustrious instance” of outlier suppression, the opinion should 
not be mistaken for the most illustrative instance.188 The quintes-
sential holdout should not be conflated with the quintessential 
outlier because, as should by now be evident, the broad outlier 
category defies the search for a single quintessence. 
 
 184 Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy at 120 (cited in note 3). 
 185 See, for example, Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch at 4 (cited in note 3) (not-
ing the Court’s propensity for “identif[ying] a strong national sentiment and impos[ing] it 
on a few isolated state outliers (striking down an obsolete state ban on contraceptives, 
for example)”); Sunstein, 122 Harv L Rev at 260 (cited in note 3) (treating the statute at 
issue in Griswold as the quintessential outlier). 
 186 See, for example, Klarman, 82 Va L Rev at 16–17 (cited in note 5) (listing Gris-
wold first as an instance of the Court’s outlier jurisprudence). 
 187 410 US 113 (1973). 
 188 Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution at 117 (cited in note 3). 
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Even Griswold, when contextualized within its larger era, 
reveals the frailties of the outlier-as-backwater framework. 
Connecticut certainly boasted the most comprehensive anticon-
traceptive statute in the country, closely followed by Massachu-
setts; it is tempting to view these two states as utterly isolated, 
even fetid, backwaters.189 In actuality, though, those two states’ 
anticontraceptive statutes were not nearly so isolated as one 
might assume when assessed from the standpoint of the 1960s. 
While Connecticut and Massachusetts were alone in prohibiting 
all sale and distribution of contraceptives, more than half of the 
states in the nation joined them with statutes forbidding adver-
tisements for contraceptives.190 Nearly one-third of the states, 
moreover, had laws permitting only certain authorized medical 
professionals to distribute contraceptives.191 Only a minority of 
states had no laws whatsoever on the books regulating contra-
ceptives during that time.192 Thus, to the extent one regards any 
contraceptive regulation during the 1960s as evincing backwater 
attitudes, it is important to understand that the backwaters en-
gulfed much of the country. 
An examination of the voting margins by which the Court 
has rejected outlier statutes further undermines the notion that 
the Court’s opinions invariably involve bringing what the justices 
generally regard as local backwaters into the national current. If 
the outlier measures embodied attitudes that observers widely 
agreed were alarming and eccentric, one might expect Supreme 
Court justices to invalidate outlier laws by consistently lopsided 
margins. Judicial assessments of constitutional law cannot, of 
course, be reduced solely to a judge’s normative inclinations; but 
neither would it be wise to deny that such inclinations often play 
an important role in shaping judicial assessments of a statute’s 
constitutionality.193 Justices are selected from a national elite 
that—regardless of political affiliation—might be thought to 
have a common disdain for measures that they deem beyond the 
pale and therefore might be able to locate common ground in 
 
 189 See C. Thomas Dienes, Law, Politics, and Birth Control 44–47 (Illinois 1972). 
 190 See id at 317–19. 
 191 See id. 
 192 See id. 
 193 See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political 
Court, 119 Harv L Rev 32, 40 (2005) (noting that constitutional law often assumes a “politi-
cal” cast); Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 5–6 (cited in note 3) (emphasizing 
how a judge’s normative views shape interpretations of indeterminate constitutional text). 
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invalidating such outré measures.194 Yet the Supreme Court has 
often suppressed outliers by not overwhelming majorities, but 
the narrowest of margins.195 When a statute’s constitutionality 
hinges on the votes of one or two justices, it seems difficult to 
believe that informed observers almost uniformly view the 
measure as a blatant affront to the current constitutional order. 
The Court’s resolution of the upstart measure at issue in 
Plyler illustrates the point. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly from 
today’s vantage point, the statute that Plyler invalidated was 
not contemporaneously derided as a law that only an outlandish 
cowboy mentality prevalent in Texas could possibly find consti-
tutional. Four justices found the Texas statute passed constitu-
tional muster.196 This 5–4 split in Plyler hardly suggests the sort 
of lopsided spread that one might anticipate if the statute 
embodied truly bizarre attitudes from a national perspective. 
When the Court discussed Plyler in conference, moreover, Justice 
William Rehnquist referred to the schoolchildren targeted by 
Texas’s law as “wetbacks.”197 That a Supreme Court justice 
would use such inflammatory language in discussing a closely 
divided case with colleagues vividly attests to the animus di-
rected toward unauthorized immigrants during the early 
1980s—even on the national stage, even in the most rarefied en-
vironments. Perhaps even more tellingly, though, only one of 
Rehnquist’s colleagues—Justice Thurgood Marshall—appears to 
have orally objected to his using the term.198 At least one close 
Court watcher thought that Plyler quite conceivably could have 
resulted in a decision that affirmed the Texas statute: John 
Roberts, who was a special assistant to the US attorney general 
when the Court issued Plyler, coauthored a memorandum la-
menting the solicitor general’s failure to support the Texas law 
because he speculated it may have prompted the Court to up-
hold the statute.199 
 
 194 See Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 6, 452 (cited in note 3) (noting 
that justices are drawn from society’s elite). 
 195 In Professor Adrian Vermeule’s terms, the lesson here is that the Supreme Court 
is a “they,” not an “it.” See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an 
It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J Contemp Legal Issues 549 (2005). 
 196 See Plyler, 457 US at 242 (Burger dissenting, joined by White, Rehnquist, and 
O’Connor). 
 197 Seth Stern and Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 475 
(Houghton 2010). 
 198 See id. 
 199 See Linda Greenhouse, What Would Justice Powell Do? The “Alien Children” 
Case and the Meaning of Equal Protection, 25 Const Commen 29, 30–31 (2008). 
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Plyler is not, moreover, unusual in eliciting considerable 
support from justices to uphold the challenged outlier. Only five 
justices voted to invalidate the throwback death penalty statute 
for child rape in Kennedy and the upstart local housing ordi-
nance in Moore.200 Similarly, only six justices voted to prohibit 
the upstart antigay legislation at issue in Romer, the holdout 
poll tax in Harper, and the backup death penalty for rape at is-
sue in Coker.201 Indeed, the only three archetypal outlier-
suppressing opinions explored in Part I that garnered lopsided 
majorities occurred when the Court invalidated the anticontra-
ceptive holdout statute in Griswold, the holdout jurisdictions’ 
views on counsel for indigent defendants in Gideon, and the 
backup establishment of VWIL in Virginia. All three of those 
cases saw at least seven justices vote to invalidate the measures 
under review.202 
When one examines the frequency with which the Supreme 
Court’s outlier-suppressing decisions invalidate measures that 
lower courts have affirmed, a similar pattern emerges—again 
belying the notion that outliers always strike judges as back-
ward. Griswold reversed a Connecticut Supreme Court opinion 
that validated the anticontraceptive statute.203 Harper reversed 
a three-judge district court opinion that upheld Virginia’s impo-
sition of the poll tax.204 Gideon reversed a Florida Supreme 
Court opinion that denied counsel to an indigent defendant 
charged with a felony.205 Moore reversed an Ohio Court of Ap-
peals decision that upheld a grandmother’s conviction for the 
crime of living with her grandchild.206 Virginia reversed a Fourth 
Circuit opinion that validated the establishment of VWIL as an 
alternative to admitting women to VMI.207 Coker reversed a 
 
 200 Kennedy, 554 US at 411; Moore, 431 US at 494. 
 201 Romer, 517 US at 621; Harper, 383 US at 664; Coker, 433 US at 584. Powell’s 
opinion rejected the imposition of capital punishment on Coker’s particular facts, but re-
fused to categorically prohibit states from imposing the death penalty for rape. See 
Coker, 433 US at 603–04 (Powell concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 202 Griswold, 381 US at 480; Gideon, 372 US at 336; Virginia, 518 US at 518. 
 203 Griswold, 381 US at 480, 485, revg State v Griswold, 200 A2d 479 (Conn 1964). 
 204 Harper, 383 US at 664–65 & n 2, 670, revg Harper v Virginia State Board of 
Elections, 240 F Supp 270 (ED Va 1964). 
 205 Gideon, 372 US at 336–37, 345, revg Gideon v Cochran, 135 S2d 746 (Fla 1961). 
 206 Moore, 431 US at 496–97, 506, revg City of East Cleveland v Moore, No 33888 
(Ohio App July 18, 1975). 
 207 Virginia, 518 US at 528–29, 557–58, revg United States v Virginia, 44 F3d 1229 
(4th Cir 1995). 
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Georgia Supreme Court opinion that upheld imposition of the 
death penalty for raping an adult woman.208 Lane reversed a 
Tenth Circuit opinion that upheld Oklahoma’s effort to preserve 
the grandfather clause.209 And Kennedy reversed a Louisiana 
Supreme Court opinion that deemed capital punishment per-
missible for raping a minor.210 
These reversals effectively mean that, had the Court de-
clined to grant relief, all of these outlier measures would have 
remained in place. Indeed, among all of the archetypal outlier 
cases, the Court’s opinions in Romer and Plyler were the only 
two that affirmed lower court decisions.211 It is at least some-
what confounding that lower courts granted relief only in those 
particular two cases because the upstart regimes at issue ap-
peared to rank among the most popular outlier measures that 
the Court has invalidated.212 Romer and Plyler thus do precious 
little to confirm the narrative of Supreme Court justices issuing 
outlier-suppressing opinions that merely invalidate backwater 
statutes.213 
When legal scholars portray outliers as emerging only from 
isolated backwaters, the move bears some resemblance to mod-
ern politicians who proclaim to audiences on the campaign 
 
 208 Coker, 433 US at 586, 600, revg Coker v State, 216 SE2d 782 (Ga 1975). 
 209 Lane, 307 US at 269, 277, revg Lane v Wilson, 98 F2d 980 (10th Cir 1938). 
 210 Kennedy, 554 US at 413, revg State v Kennedy, 957 S2d 757 (La 2007). 
 211 See Romer, 517 US at 636; Plyler, 457 US at 230. 
 212 See text accompanying notes 150–51, 178–81. 
 213 In the broader context of the Court’s outlier-suppressing opinions, this marked 
pattern of reversing lower court decisions does not appear aberrational. Consider the 
Court’s outlier-suppressing opinions that involved gender equality during the 1970s. See, 
for example, Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 359–60, 370 (1979), revg State v Duren, 556 
SW2d 11 (Mo 1977) (reversing the Missouri Supreme Court opinion that validated a 
state measure granting women, but not men, an automatic exemption from jury duty on 
request); Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 191–92 (1976), revg Walker v Hall, 399 F Supp 
1304 (WD Okla 1975) (reversing the three-judge district court opinion that validated the 
state’s inequitable statute for alcohol consumption); Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 523, 
525 (1975), revg State v Taylor, 282 S2d 491 (La 1973) (reversing the Louisiana Supreme 
Court opinion that validated the state’s measure requiring women, but not men, to vol-
unteer in order to be eligible for juror service); Reed v Reed, 404 US 71, 74, 77 (1971), 
revg Reed v Reed, 465 P2d 635 (Idaho 1970) (reversing the Idaho Supreme Court opinion 
that validated the state’s male-preferring intestacy statute). It is certainly true that the 
Supreme Court has for many years far more frequently reversed lower court decisions 
than it has affirmed them. See Lee Epstein, et al, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, 
Decisions, and Developments 244–45 (CQ Press 4th ed 2007) (noting reversal rates). Yet 
one might suppose that outlier-suppressing opinions would buck this broad trend if the 
outlier measures struck the bench as truly backward. That appears not to be the case. 
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stump: This is the real America.214 The outlier-as-backwater notion 
works in a similar way, only in reverse. That outlier jurisdiction 
is not the real America, the academic argument might be formu-
lated. But skepticism of both essentialist notions about the nation 
and its ideological commitments would appear to be warranted. 
Thus, the overly broad view that construes all outlier-
suppressing opinions as challenging backward measures may 
contain some backwardness of its own. 
C. Insignificance? 
A direct result of the misperceptions that outlier-
suppressing opinions simply modernize outdated statutes and 
flush out backwaters is the notion that these opinions involve 
issues that are of, at most, modest significance to the nation 
generally. Outlier-suppressing decisions may matter to the peo-
ple who have the misfortune of living within the borders of a 
particular outlying state, scholars allow, but that should not be 
mistaken for understanding the decisions to hold national sig-
nificance. Professor Tushnet contends: “Almost by definition 
‘outliers’ aren’t all that important to the nation as a whole, no 
matter how difficult they make life in one or another state.”215 
Professor Klarman advances a version of this claim with par-
ticular verve: “Invoking the Constitution to invalidate extreme 
outlier practices hardly represents a momentous contribution to 
the story of American freedom.”216 Outlier-suppressing opinions, 
Klarman insists, “are consonant with dominant national norms 
and thus are best described as reflecting rather than producing 
national unity.”217 When judges issue outlier-suppressing opin-
ions, this analysis suggests, they are not shaping society’s foun-
dations; instead, they are merely tweaking society’s edges. Articu-
lating this view, Easterbrook has contended that the Court’s 
penchant for challenging outliers, rather than “changing the 
rules under which most persons lived,” is consistent with its ex-
 
 214 See Paul Krugman, E Pluribus Unum, NY Times A19 (July 5, 2013) (critiquing 
the idea of the “real America” as rural, white, and Protestant). 
 215 Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters at 103–04 (cited in note 3). 
 216 Klarman, 42 Wm & Mary L Rev at 279 (cited in note 168). 
 217 Klarman, 93 Nw U L Rev at 172 (cited in note 108) (contending that constitu-
tional interpretation “deploy[s] a national consensus to suppress outliers”). See also 
Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 453 (cited in note 3) (“More constitutional 
law than is commonly supposed reflects this tendency to constitutionalize consensus and 
suppress outliers.”). 
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tremely narrow ability to produce social reform.218 “To under-
stand the effect of law,” Easterbrook instructs, “you must look at 
effects on the margin.”219 Whittington has echoed Easterbrook’s 
sentiment, contending that judges “correct small-scale injustices 
by bringing outliers into line with mainstream norms” and sug-
gesting the effects of such opinions occur “at the margin.”220 The 
language that legal scholars often use to describe outlier-
suppressing opinions—drawn from the context of domestic work 
that purportedly demands only modest exertion—bolsters this 
notion that such opinions do not present constitutional issues of 
central importance. Thus, when the Supreme Court invalidates 
outlying measures, it engages in what scholars have variously 
termed “mopping up operations,”221 “cleaning up operations,”222 
and “housecleaning.”223 
The Court’s outlier-suppressing opinions do not, however, 
always involve interventions in realms that are ancillary to 
foundational national concerns. At least some of the Court’s 
outlier-suppressing opinions help to ensure that measures cur-
rently found in a small number of states do not spread to other 
states and eventually become the dominant approach. There is a 
vast difference between invalidating what appears to be among 
the last of a few remaining statutes and invalidating the first of 
what could be a great many statutes to come. In rejecting some 
outlier variants, judges do not discard a bouquet that has over-
stayed its welcome so much as nip an unwelcome development 
in the statutory bud. After glimpsing what could be the nation’s 
legislative future, the Court sometimes rejects the outlying leg-
islation and issues an opinion that is designed to prevent that 
 
 218 Frank H. Easterbrook, Bills of Rights and Regression to the Mean, 15 Harv J L & 
Pub Pol 71, 74 (1992). 
 219 Id at 77. 
 220 Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objec-
tions and Responses, 80 NC L Rev 773, 834 (2002). 
 221 Mark Tushnet, The Role of Courts in Social Change: Looking Forward?, 54 
Drake L Rev 909, 925 (2006). See also Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process after 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 Mich L Rev 1517, 1539 (2008) (referring to outlier-suppressing 
opinions as “mopping up”); Mark Tushnet, Political Power and Judicial Power: Some Ob-
servations on Their Relation, 75 Fordham L Rev 755, 759 n 19, 767 (2006) (referring to 
outlier-suppressing opinions as “mopping-up operations” and “mop[ping] up outliers”). 
 222 Eskridge, 100 Mich L Rev at 2373 (cited in note 3). See also Tushnet, Why the 
Constitution Matters at 101 (cited in note 3) (contending that elected officials “assigned 
the job of cleaning up the statute books to the Supreme Court”); William N. Eskridge Jr, 
Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U Pa L Rev 419, 513 
(2001) (labeling outlier-suppressing decisions as “clean-up operations”). 
 223 Eskridge, 150 U Pa L Rev at 513 (cited in note 222). 
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future development from taking hold. Even if outlier-
suppressing opinions are not—in the moment—widely appreci-
ated as carrying national import, those opinions may ultimately 
still play an important role in shaping the entire nation’s consti-
tutional order. By issuing opinions that severely constrain the 
likelihood that other jurisdictions will successfully implement an 
invalidated measure, some outlier-suppressing opinions can in-
deed be viewed as representing significant contributions to the 
nation’s freedom. 
The Supreme Court’s invalidation of the upstart statute at 
issue in Plyler richly illustrates how outlier-suppressing opin-
ions can, at least sometimes, shape foundational values across 
the nation. Texas may well have been the first state in the na-
tion that sought to exclude unauthorized immigrants from its 
public schools, but it certainly was not the last. In 1994, California 
voters adopted Proposition 187, a measure that would have, 
among other things, prohibited unauthorized immigrants from 
attending public schools.224 It did not take long for a federal dis-
trict court to conclude that the measure conflicted with Plyler’s 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.225 In 2011, the Ala-
bama legislature enacted a broad immigration law that included 
a provision requiring public school officials to ascertain the im-
migration status of enrolling students.226 One year later, the 
Eleventh Circuit rejected the education provision because it con-
travened Plyler.227 Perhaps even more consequential than these 
judicial invalidations of state laws, though, is how civil rights 
groups have wielded Plyler against school districts that have 
demanded information from enrolling students that unauthor-
ized immigrants cannot provide. Those enrollment practices are 
not confined to school districts located in either southern states 
or states that border Mexico. Instead, such practices have been 
found in states throughout the nation, including Illinois, Indiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, and New York.228 
 
 224 See David A. Sklansky, Proposition 187 and the Ghost of James Bradley Thayer, 
17 UCLA Chicano-Latino L Rev 24, 35 (1995). The measure passed with 59 percent of 
the vote. Id. 
 225 See League of United Latin American Citizens v Wilson, 908 F Supp 755, 774 (CD 
Cal 1995). 
 226 Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (HB 56), 2011 
Ala Laws 535, codified at Ala Code Ann § 31-13-27(a). 
 227 See Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v Alabama, 691 F3d 1236, 1245 (11th 
Cir 2012). 
 228 See Kirk Semple, US Warns Schools against Checking Immigration Status, NY 
Times A14 (May 7, 2011); Jaclyn Brickman, Note, Educating Undocumented Children in 
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In recent years, civil rights groups have motivated state educa-
tion officials in all of those jurisdictions to warn school districts 
against requiring information from enrolling students that 
would cause unauthorized immigrants to reveal their immigra-
tion status.229 Two years ago, the federal government joined the 
chorus condemning these enrollment practices when the Depart-
ment of Justice relied on Plyler to inform school administrators 
that the practices violated federal law.230 
The Court’s opinion in Plyler should not be minimized as 
some trivial event in the nation’s constitutional history. Although 
the decision initially applied exclusively to Texas, Plyler has en-
joyed broad applicability throughout the nation, serving as a 
bulwark against persistent measures that would deprive unau-
thorized immigrants of an education. It is difficult to identify 
many opinions in the entire US Reports that have had more pro-
found consequences, in more important arenas, than Plyler’s, 
guaranteeing that the schoolhouse doors cannot be closed to one 
of society’s most marginalized groups. Even though many 
Americans disagree with Plyler—or, rather, precisely because of 
that broad disagreement—the opinion should be understood as 
making a vital contribution to closing the gap between the na-
tion’s lofty rhetoric and its lowly realities.231 
In suggesting that outlier-suppressing opinions deal with 
statutes that are insignificant to the nation as a whole, scholars 
risk unduly discounting the contingent nature of legal history. 
Simply because modern American society has assumed its current 
form, in other words, should not be mistaken for meaning that its 
features were somehow foreordained to assume this particular 
shape.232 Yet outlier-minded legal scholars can sometimes seem 
 
the United States: Codification of Plyler v. Doe through Federal Legislation, 20 George-
town Immig L J 385, 398 & n 76 (2006). 
 229 See Semple, US Warns Schools against Checking Immigration Status, NY Times 
at A14 (cited in note 228); Brickman, Note, 20 Georgetown Immig L J at 398 n 76 (cited 
in note 228). 
 230 See Semple, US Warns Schools against Checking Immigration Status, NY Times 
at A14 (cited in note 228). 
 231 Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Plyler contended that Texas’s statute affronted 
American ideals: “The existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems 
for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.” Plyler, 
457 US at 219. 
 232 See generally Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics 
in the Era before Brown, 115 Yale L J 256 (2005) (encouraging scholars to avoid examining 
early legal efforts to achieve racial desegregation with Brown in mind as the ultimate 
destination). 
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to engage in a type of Whiggish approach to the nation’s legal 
development, in which the past is viewed as an inevitable march 
toward enlightenment.233 After all, a strikingly large number of 
core outlier-suppressing opinions occupy an exalted place in le-
gal academia. Many constitutional scholars believe the decisions 
in Gideon, Griswold, Harper, Romer, Plyler, Moore, and Virginia 
not only reached the correct outcomes, but also that the opinions 
advanced the cause of justice.234 These cases inspire feelings not 
only of respect, but also of reverence. And while outlier-minded 
theorists warn against exaggerating the jurisdictional magni-
tude of these opinions, their analysis often suggests that society 
was already moving toward the destination of justice; the 
Court’s decisions simply expedited the nation’s arrival.235 Indeed, 
it is sometimes suggested that in invalidating outliers, the Court 
simply predicts the future: the justices determine in which direc-
tion the political winds are blowing, identify an obvious outlier, 
and issue an opinion that anticipates a statute’s inevitable de-
mise.236 If these outlier-suppressing opinions embodied laudable 
values and the nation as a whole would have certainly embraced 
these values regardless of the Court’s intervention, then the 
opinions can be viewed as modest steps in the nation’s Whiggish 
procession to enlightenment. 
 
 233 See Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History 9–33 (G. Bell 1931); 
Ernst Mayr, When Is Historiography Whiggish?, 51 J Hist Ideas 301, 301–03 (1990). 
 234 See generally, for example, Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pur-
suit of Justice (Hill and Wang 1998). 
 235 See, for example, Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 895 (cited in note 5) (“[I]t seems 
reasonably clear that part of what is going on in the areas where the Supreme Court is 
modernizing . . . is that the justices are hastening along developments that are occurring 
anyway but that the justices would like to see move faster.”). At least one observer con-
temporaneously portrayed Harper’s invalidation of the poll tax as (unnecessarily) expe-
diting a foreordained outcome: 
[T]he Court made law in the poll tax case when it was clearly not necessary to 
do so. If ever there was a legal device doomed for extinction, it was the poll 
taxes of the South, where politicians are suddenly clamoring for issues to at-
tract the thousands of newly-enfranchised Negro voters. 
Fred P. Graham, Court’s Final Word on Poll Taxes: “No,” NY Times 198 (Mar 27, 1966). 
 236 See, for example, Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 861 (cited in note 5) (contending 
that modernization involves predicting the future). Klarman’s work emphasizes how the 
Court’s legitimacy flows from the accuracy of its predictions. See Klarman, 89 Cal L Rev 
at 1756 (cited in note 8) (“[T]he Court’s reputation may depend, to a significant degree, 
on the Justices’ skill at predicting the future.”). Such contentions build on the founda-
tional work of Alexander Bickel. See Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 
at 102–81 (cited in note 101) (contending that the Supreme Court “remembers the fu-
ture” in deciding cases). 
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This conception of outlier-suppressing opinions suffers from 
two interrelated shortcomings. First, this view inaccurately sug-
gests that American attitudes can broadly be mapped onto a 
narrative of ascent, with each generation embracing ever more 
egalitarian attitudes than the one that preceded it. But the 
Court has issued outlier-suppressing opinions in critical areas—
including unauthorized immigration, capital punishment, and 
criminal procedure—in which attitudes seem to defy such tidy 
accounts. Each of those issues has, as a matter of political con-
testation, elicited undulating attitudes from American citizens, 
not unidirectional ascent toward enlightenment.237 Second, this 
view unduly minimizes the Supreme Court’s role in forging the 
nation’s constitutional values. The justices are not mere by-
standers to the nation’s constitutional conversation, but full-
throated participants who alter its very contours.238 Portraying 
the justices as mere forecasters—picture nine meteorologists in 
black robes—conceals their ability to influence the nation’s con-
stitutional climate. Even when the justices depict their outlier-
suppressing opinions as merely expediting matters, it is important 
to understand that those opinions are themselves constitutive of 
the modern constitutional order. Professor John Hart Ely ex-
pressed this point memorably many years ago: “[T]he fact that 
things turned out as the Supreme Court predicted may prove only 
that the Supreme Court is the Supreme Court. Thus by predicting 
the future the justices will unavoidably help shape it, and by 
shaping the future they will unavoidably . . . shape the present.”239 
Understanding that the Supreme Court’s outlier-
suppressing opinions cannot all be dismissed as of marginal sig-
nificance may help scholars to gauge the normative desirability 
of judicial review with greater accuracy. Some left-leaning 
scholars have in recent years questioned whether judicial review 
has been a net negative or positive force in advancing and 
 
 237 See Greenhouse, 25 Const Commen at 29–30, 46, 48–50 (cited in note 199) (noting 
nativist moments that periodically seize the nation); Death Penalty (Gallup 2014), online 
at http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (visited Aug 12, 2014) (charting 
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 238 See Archibald Cox, The Warren Court: Constitutional Decisions as an Instrument 
of Reform 26–27 (Harvard 1968) (contending that Supreme Court justices help to shape 
national values). 
 239 Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 70 (cited in note 15). 
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preserving liberal causes.240 If outlier-suppressing opinions are 
understood as merely expediting inevitable developments, then 
it would seem safe to minimize, or perhaps even ignore alto-
gether, such opinions in assessing whether judicial review has 
made egalitarian contributions to American society. Yet as the 
above analysis suggests, outlier-suppressing opinions might not 
be dismissed so casually. If some such opinions involved not only 
the relatively modest question of when (within a concentrated 
period of time a constitutional right would be recognized), but 
instead resolved the fundamental question of whether (a consti-
tutional right would be recognized at all), then assessing judicial 
review’s value may require grappling with outlier-suppressing 
opinions at extended length. Properly evaluating the egalitarian 
contributions of the Court’s opinions rejecting outliers could 
require some left-leaning scholars to undertake a fundamental 
reassessment of whether judicial review has overall proven 
beneficial to the causes they hold dear. But even if that reas-
sessment bolsters the case supporting judicial review in only a 
relatively modest fashion, it may still prove decisive. If, as some 
have suggested, determining whether judicial review’s benefits 
have outweighed its costs presents an exceedingly close call, 
even a small amount of weight could make all the difference.241 
One reason scholars may understate the import of some 
outlier-suppressing opinions is that the term has overwhelmingly 
been applied in retrospect. Because the term outlier dates back 
only to the early 1990s, most archetypal cases involving outliers 
had long since been decided before they received the appellation. 
That passage of time could lead to a distorted perspective, as an 
opinion that initially struck observers as momentous and conse-
quential may over time seem to recede in significance as the 
opinion becomes simply another fixture of the nation’s constitu-
tional framework. While the passage of time may render all judi-
cial opinions at least somewhat vulnerable to such retrospective 
diminution, outlier-suppressing opinions would seem particularly 
prone to downgrading precisely because they formally reject 
 
 240 See, for example, Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts at 172–
73 (cited in note 10) (questioning how much judicial review has aided liberal and pro-
gressive causes); Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism 
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practices found in only a small number of states. In the context 
of constitutional outliers, then, hindsight may sometimes yield 
not perfect vision but myopia. 
This notion that seeing outlier-suppressing opinions in the 
rearview mirror can lead scholars to accord those opinions insuf-
ficient import is not mere conjecture. Rather, it acutely describes 
shifting academic assessment of the Court’s most prominent 
outlier-suppressing opinion issued since the term outlier entered 
constitutional parlance. When the Court decided Romer in 1996, 
some outlier-minded scholars initially portrayed the opinion as 
resolving a fraught question in a highly divisive arena.242 The 
question raised by Colorado’s Amendment 2 was regarded as so 
divisive, in fact, that scholars originally declined to label Romer 
an outlier-suppressing opinion altogether, even in scholarship 
that viewed cases through that prism.243 With the passage of 
time, however, scholars eventually came to classify Romer as an 
outlier-suppressing opinion and, in the process, reconceptualized 
it as an opinion of marginal import.244 
This downgrading of Romer’s significance suggests that the 
outlier framework has, at times, suffered from a form of hind-
sight bias.245 A few years after the Court invalidated Amend-
ment 2, a statewide measure expressly prohibiting gays and les-
bians from seeking the protection of antidiscrimination laws 
would have likely grown to seem more and more unusual—and 
perhaps over time even come to seem unthinkable. But that per-
ception of increasing strangeness is inescapably influenced by 
the constitutional world that the opinion in Romer itself helped 
to create.246 Romer can be understood as having effects on two 
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different levels. On a concrete level, Romer’s existence may, at 
least conceivably, have dissuaded other states from adopting 
measures like Amendment 2.247 Perhaps more importantly, on 
an expressive level, Romer was the first consequential Supreme 
Court decision to communicate the resounding message that ani-
mus directed toward gays and lesbians violates the Constitution. 
From today’s vantage point it may be difficult to recall, but Ro-
mer came as an utter shock to contemporary legal observers—
even to ardent advocates of gay equality.248 Professor Louis Michael 
Seidman’s ebullient assessment, offered in Romer’s immediate 
wake, attests to how the decision was initially hailed as a reve-
lation. “If there is ever a final reckoning of twentieth-century 
constitutionalism,” Seidman wrote, “Romer v. Evans will stand 
as a monument to the transformative possibilities of constitutional 
law. . . . By handing gay people their first major Supreme Court 
victory in the history of the republic, the opinion substantially 
alters the legal landscape.”249 As a technical matter, Romer may 
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have altered the law in only one lonely state, but it seems deeply 
misguided to deny that its effects were anything less than na-
tional in scope. 
Finally, it is essential to contest the myth that outlier-
suppressing opinions must implicate measures of marginal sig-
nificance because, if judges accept that notion, it may decrease 
their willingness to issue constitutional opinions protecting 
marginalized groups. Outlier-minded constitutional scholars 
frequently suggest that what the Supreme Court does “best” is 
reject insignificant outliers, and that the Court invites trouble 
when it attempts to resolve divisive social issues by counteracting 
widespread measures.250 But if engaged members of the legal 
community do not in the heat of the moment regard a particular 
measure as insignificant, even though it can be found in a small 
number of states, then justices who internalized the message of 
outlier-minded theorists may opt to refrain from invalidating 
the measure solely to avoid causing unwanted controversy. This 
analysis means that in Romer, for instance, justices who sub-
scribed to the traditional understanding of outliers as involving 
definitionally inconsequential measures may have declined to 
invalidate Amendment 2 because the measure seemed immensely 
consequential at the time of decision. And for judges, of course, 
the time of decision is the time that counts.251 Furthermore, a 
hypothetical–Supreme Court opinion that validated Amendment 
2 because the measure seemed too explosive could have had 
negative downstream consequences, effectively inviting states to 
enact their own versions of the measure. Justices must understand 
that, even when invalidating outliers, the opinion may feel less 
like “housecleaning” than an extremely heavy lift. 
More broadly, the historical record undermines the claim that 
the Supreme Court can engage in nothing more than “mopping 
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121, 128 (2012) (“[T]here is a reasonable argument that enforcing the will of a national 
majority against outlier states is what the Supreme Court does best.”). 
 251 See Driver, 2011 S Ct Rev at 384 (cited in note 248) (“A theory of judging does 
not seem to provide much help if it fails to comport with how judges themselves under-
stand their own actions in deciding cases at the time of the decisions.”). 
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up” fringe statutes, or that the justices invariably inflict long-
term damage on the Court as an institution when they endeavor 
to challenge widespread practices throughout the nation.252 To 
the contrary, the Court has sometimes interpreted the Constitu-
tion in a manner that takes what is for practical purposes an 
outlier measure and has successfully imposed that vision on the 
nation as a whole. These opinions—which we might term “outlier-
inverting opinions”—have occurred in salient areas and have 
afforded constitutional protection to widely reviled groups. In 
West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette,253 the Su-
preme Court in 1943 upset practices present in all forty-eight 
states when it found that public school districts acted unconsti-
tutionally by expelling Jehovah’s Witnesses for refusing to salute 
the American flag.254 In Miranda v Arizona,255 the Supreme Court 
in 1966 required police officers in nearly every state to follow new 
arrest procedures.256 In Shapiro v Thompson,257 the Supreme Court 
in 1969 rejected laws found in more than forty states when it de-
termined that jurisdictions may not attach durational residency 
requirements to welfare benefits without violating the Constitu-
tion’s right to travel.258 In Texas v Johnson,259 the Supreme Court in 
1986 invalidated laws found in forty-eight states when it deter-
mined that prohibitions on burning the American flag violated 
the First Amendment.260 These opinions undoubtedly offer some 
of the more spectacular instances in which the Supreme Court 
has successfully mounted challenges to measures that were ex-
tremely widespread throughout the nation. They are not 
alone.261 Even if these four opinions provided the only instances 
of outlier inversion, however, they would suffice to demonstrate 
 
 252 See Pildes, 2010 S Ct Rev at 151 (cited in note 146) (contending that it is easy to 
overstate the Court’s outlier-suppressing role). 
 253 319 US 624 (1943). 
 254 Id at 627, 642. See also David R. Manwaring, Render unto Caesar: The Flag-
Salute Controversy 187 (Chicago 1962). 
 255 384 US 436 (1966). 
 256 Id. See also Powe, The Warren Court at 394 (cited in note 109) (noting that all 
states had to change their laws in response to Miranda). 
 257 394 US 618 (1969). 
 258 Id at 639 n 22. 
 259 491 US 397 (1989). 
 260 Id at 434 (Rehnquist dissenting). 
 261 See, for example, Pildes, 2010 S Ct Rev at 151 (cited in note 146) (noting that 
New York Times Co v Sullivan “invalidated the libel laws of every state”); Reynolds v 
Sims, 377 US 533, 610–11 (1964) (Harlan dissenting) (observing that the Court’s deci-
sion invalidated the composition of state legislatures across the nation). 
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that the Supreme Court possesses far greater judicial capacity 
than outlier-minded theorists sometimes seem to allow. 
III.  DEMARCATING OUTLIERS 
Until this point, I have charted the divisions that exist within 
the term outlier and traced some of the more significant implica-
tions for constitutional theory that flow from understanding that 
the term should be viewed as multiple rather than singular. I 
have not, however, in any way attempted to define the concept’s 
boundaries. Yet it is crucial to explore the borders of what con-
stitutes an outlier-suppressing opinion because scholars have 
used the term in inconsistent and even contradictory fashions, 
thereby sowing confusion. Indeed, outlier-minded scholars have 
implicitly disagreed whether that term applies to three of the 
Supreme Court’s most meaningful constitutional decisions of the 
last six decades: Brown, Loving, and Lawrence. These silent dis-
agreements within the broad camp of outlier-minded constitu-
tional theorists should be neither ignored nor brushed aside; in-
stead, they demand forthright scholarly acknowledgement and 
analysis. After all, if leading proponents of the outlier theory of 
constitutional interpretation do not even agree on how to classify 
iconic Supreme Court opinions, it might be thought that those 
disputes raise serious, perhaps even unanswerable, questions 
about the theory’s intellectual coherence. But the internal dis-
agreement over this trio of celebrated opinions presents less a 
problem than an opportunity. Grappling with whether Brown, 
Loving, and Lawrence are accurately understood as invalidating 
outlier practices initiates a sorely needed conversation to deter-
mine with greater precision how widely a state practice can 
spread before it can no longer accurately be termed an outlier. 
While legal scholarship has overwhelmingly declined to under-
take this task, doing so is necessary to avoid the concept of con-
stitutional outliers being either employed in an inconsistent 
fashion or stretched beyond all recognition. 
One major reason that scholars may disagree about whether 
particular opinions should be construed as invalidating outliers 
is because these scholars consistently avoid articulating their 
criteria with any specificity for what constitutes an outlier prac-
tice. Whatever its utility as a method for identifying hardcore 
pornography, “I know it when I see it” has little to recommend it 
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as a method for identifying outliers.262 Accordingly, after analyzing 
the three high-profile cases of common disagreement, this Part 
advances specific guidelines for determining how widespread a 
practice can become before it can no longer accurately be labeled 
an outlier. It also includes a recommendation for using the term 
outlier that would, if followed, go a long way toward reducing 
confusion about the term among authors and readers alike. 
A. Identifying Nonoutliers 
Legal scholars who invoke outlier terminology divide sharply 
on whether Brown, perhaps the most celebrated decision in the 
Supreme Court’s entire history, can profitably be understood 
through the outlier framework.263 Professor Powe’s influential 
analysis of the Warren Court provides the most familiar depic-
tion of Brown as an opinion that reined in outliers.264 Powe’s cen-
tral argument rejects the view that the Warren Court’s legen-
dary opinions actually protected minorities and instead insists 
that the decisions merely “demanded national liberal values be 
adopted in outlying areas.”265 In Powe’s estimation, landmark 
judicial opinions during the 1950s and 1960s that addressed 
segregation, reapportionment, and contraception demonstrate 
that “[t]he Warren Court was routing outliers—first and fore-
most the segregated South, but also rural America and pockets 
of urban pre-Vatican II Catholic dominance—and bringing na-
tional values to bear on all of them.”266 Brown may have helped 
to “nationalize[ ]” what Powe labels “the legal regime of race,” 
but he argues it would be misguided to overlook that the opinion 
“was directed exclusively at the South and was designed to force 
the South to conform to northern—that is, national—norms.”267 
While Powe’s portrayal of Brown may be the foremost such 
 
 262 Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart concurring). 
 263 See, for example, Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District 
No. 1, 551 US 701, 867 (2007) (Breyer dissenting) (calling Brown the Supreme Court’s 
“finest hour”). 
 264 See Powe, The Warren Court at 490 (cited in note 109). See also Tushnet, Why 
the Constitution Matters at 97 (cited in note 3) (identifying Powe’s book on the Warren 
Court as “the most astute detailed analysis”). 
 265 Powe, The Warren Court at 494 (cited in note 109). 
 266 Powe, 83 Tex L Rev at 888 (cited in note 166). For Powe’s earliest articulation of 
this theme, see Powe, 11 Const Commen at 197 (cited in note 166). 
 267 Powe, The Warren Court at 490 (cited in note 109). 
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reading, his assessment of the case as suppressing southern out-
liers is far from idiosyncratic.268 
On the debate’s opposing side, it is not simply that some legal 
scholars who otherwise use the term outlier eschew that word 
when analyzing Brown. Instead, these scholars affirmatively 
hold up Brown as approaching the antithesis of a judicial opin-
ion that merely rejected outliers. Professor Klarman—the scholar 
most closely associated with this view—has often warned scholars 
to avoid overstating the Court’s countermajoritarian capabilities 
and has insisted that Brown tapped into an “emerging national 
consensus” on racial egalitarianism.269 Nevertheless, Klarman 
has also consistently maintained that Brown did not involve 
simple outlier suppression.270 Where Powe broadly conceives 
Griswold and Brown as opinions of a piece, Klarman portrays 
those two decisions as drawing on categorically distinct amounts 
of judicial capacity.271 If Griswold’s outlier suppression was an 
easy lift for the Court, Klarman has suggested, Brown displayed 
the Court near maximum exertion.272 Klarman’s work is far from 
the only outlier-influenced scholarship that can be read to con-
tend that Brown should not be placed within the outlier frame-
work, and to suggest further that Brown may more accurately be 
construed as the Court’s prototypical opinion challenging a 
nonoutlier practice.273 
 
 268 See, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Consti-
tution, 103 Nw U L Rev 549, 562–65 (2009) (portraying Brown as bringing outliers into 
line with the nation’s dominant political norms); Easterbrook, 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 
74 (cited in note 218) (contesting the notion that the Court, in issuing Brown, did any-
thing more than suppress outliers); Roosevelt, 91 Tex L Rev at 128 (cited in note 250) 
(contending that Brown suppressed outliers). 
 269 Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 310 (cited in note 3). For a critique of 
the notion that Brown simply recognized an “emerging national consensus”—and of the 
phenomenon of consensus constitutionalism more broadly—see Justin Driver, The Con-
sensus Constitution, 89 Tex L Rev 755, 758 (2011) (“When the Court decided Brown v. 
Board of Education, the racial attitudes of Americans revealed greater complexity and 
inner conflict (both regionally and racially) than the consensus-constitutionalist narra-
tive generally allows.”). 
 270 See, for example, Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 453 (cited in note 
3) (contending that Brown was not a case that should be understood as routing outliers); 
Klarman, 82 Va L Rev at 16–17 & n 80 (cited in note 5) (same). 
 271 See Klarman, 82 Va L Rev at 16–17 & n 80 (cited in note 5) (identifying Griswold 
as a classic opinion that rejected an outlier practice and Brown as a classic opinion that 
challenged a more widespread practice). 
 272 See id at 17–18. 
 273 See, for example, Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch at 4 (cited in note 3) (iden-
tifying Griswold as the Court’s paradigmatic case involving outlier suppression and 
Brown as the Court’s paradigmatic case involving considerably more than simple outlier 
suppression); David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 118 (Oxford 2010) (contrasting 
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The most compelling notion of constitutional outliers, I be-
lieve, excludes Brown from the category because an excessively 
large number of states permitted racial segregation in public 
schools when the case was decided. In 1954, when the Court de-
cided Brown, seventeen states required racial segregation in 
public schools, and an additional four states allowed localities to 
implement the practice.274 Given that 21 of the 48 states (44 per-
cent) embraced some form of racial segregation, it is difficult to 
understand how the term outlier helpfully describes that legal 
landscape. I have not encountered any constitutional scholar 
who has labeled a Supreme Court decision that challenged the 
practices in a majority of states as rejecting outliers. Such a la-
bel would, of course, be mystifying because it would require 
treating the most commonly found arrangement as aberrant. 
But it is difficult to see how viewing a judicial decision that chal-
lenges a near majority of state practices as rejecting outliers has 
much more to recommend it. Describing public school segrega-
tion in 1954 as existing only among outliers, when the terms 
“near majority of states” or “large minority of states” are readily 
available, risks giving readers an overly optimistic understanding 
of the nation’s mid-twentieth-century racial realities. This unduly 
elastic conception of outliers should, accordingly, be discarded 
because it invites analytical imprecision and historical misim-
pression. 
Although Loving presents a somewhat closer case than 
Brown, legal scholars should also, I believe, discontinue the sur-
prisingly common practice of contending that the Court’s deci-
sion in Loving merely rejected outliers. Professor Eskridge, to 
take only one example, has suggested that the Court’s decision 
invalidating prohibitions on interracial marriage in 1967 rejected 
“outlier discrimination[ ]” and likened Loving to Griswold in 
that both opinions amounted to “constitutional housecleaning” 
and “fine-tuning.”275 But in 1967, sixteen of fifty states continued 
to prohibit marriages between people of different races.276 It 
 
Brown’s significance with the comparatively insignificant constitutional amendments 
that result in routing outliers). 
 274 See Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 311 (cited in note 3). 
 275 Eskridge, 150 U Pa L Rev at 513 (cited in note 222) (contending that Loving 
rejected outliers). See also Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution at 214 (cited in note 
3) (contending that, when the Court decided Loving, “bans on interracial marriage were 
relatively rare”); Roosevelt, Reconstruction and Resistance at 128 (cited in note 250) (con-
tending that Loving suppressed outliers). 
 276 See Loving, 388 US at 6. 
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seems odd to conclude, absent some extended explanation, that 
laws found in nearly one-third of the states can meaningfully be 
termed outliers. Although it may be attractive to believe that 
Americans overwhelmingly disapproved of antimiscegenation 
laws when the Court decided Loving, nationwide polls taken after 
the decision found that larger percentages of respondents ex-
pressed approval of such laws rather than disapproval.277 It 
seems, in sum, far more accurate to conceive of state laws 
against interracial marriage in 1967 as a reasonably common 
practice—one that enjoyed considerable support throughout the 
nation—even if they existed in only a minority of states. 
Some legal scholars, though certainly not all, have also con-
tended that the thirteen antisodomy provisions invalidated by 
Lawrence in 2003 should be understood as outliers.278 Lawrence 
presents an excruciatingly close call—closer even than the one 
presented by Loving. But, in my judgment, Lawrence should not 
be viewed as suppressing an outlier practice. It seems awfully 
difficult to contend that thirteen states—making up slightly 
more than one-quarter of the nation—can helpfully be termed 
outliers. Appearing to recognize this point, Professor Rosen, who 
often uses outlier terminology to describe judicial opinions, has 
suggested that the invalidation of thirteen state laws rendered 
Lawrence’s scope too large to accurately be portrayed as tackling 
outliers.279 Attempting to suggest how Lawrence might have 
been framed so that it suppressed genuine outliers, Rosen has 
argued that the opinion should have invalidated only the four stat-
utes that directly proscribed homosexual sodomy.280 That solution, 
using the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
rather than the Due Process Clause, would have left untouched 
the other nine statutes purporting to proscribe all sodomy.281 But 
Rosen’s approach appears to be predicated on disregarding the 
 
 277 See Driver, 89 Tex L Rev at 825 n 412 (cited in note 269). 
 278 See, for example, Nan D. Hunter, Book Review, Federal Courts, State Courts and 
Civil Rights: Judicial Power and Politics, 92 Georgetown L J 941, 978–79 (2004) (asserting 
that Lawrence rejected outliers); Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar at ix (cited in 
note 166) (same); Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 886 (cited in note 5) (contending, albeit 
with some hesitation, that Lawrence rejected outliers). 
 279 See Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch at 108–11, 113 (cited in note 3). 
 280 See id at 109 (“Like the Supreme Court’s most successful cases, it would have 
brought a handful of state outliers into a national consensus that sodomy cannot be 
criminalized for gays and lesbians alone.”). 
 281 As Rosen acknowledges, this solution echoes Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s con-
curring opinion in Lawrence. See Lawrence, 539 US at 579 (O’Connor concurring in the 
judgment). 
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social meaning that all antisodomy statutes had obtained by 
2003.282 Even if nine statutes were drawn in language that ap-
plied to heterosexuals and homosexuals alike, it seems safe to 
say that citizens and legislators who supported retaining those 
laws would have overwhelmingly rejected a judicial decision 
deeming it impermissible to target only homosexual sodomy. To 
the extent that an outlier inquiry is meant to depict current atti-
tudes toward a particular practice, artificially confining the issue 
presented in Lawrence to a mere four states provides a sorely 
inaccurate snapshot. 
Even the scholars who insist that Lawrence actually invali-
dated outliers—perhaps aware that the statutory context makes 
the term an awkward fit—often do so in a qualified manner. 
Thus, Professor Strauss, rather than calling the Texas statute 
an outlier outright, as he does with other measures,283 instead 
contends that it “was something of an outlier.”284 In a similar 
vein, other legal scholars who suggest that Lawrence can be 
viewed as rejecting outliers seek to shift the traditional outlier 
focus from statutory prevalence to the nonenforcement of exist-
ing statutes.285 It is certainly true that the thirteen antisodomy 
statutes were seldom enforced when the Court decided Lawrence 
in 2003.286 But by that time, the fight for gay equality centered 
less on the sporadic enforcement of antisodomy provisions and 
more on the antigay message communicated by the statutes’ 
continuing existence on the books.287 Thus, that thirteen states 
steadfastly refused to abandon laws that had become widely re-
garded as a proxy for antigay sentiment remained a central 
question for the outlier inquiry. 
To contend that mere nonenforcement renders a practice an 
outlier is, moreover, an argument that risks proving far too 
much. After all, jurisdictions infrequently enforced antisodomy 
 
 282 See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare 
Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv L Rev 1893, 1905–06 (2004) (“[E]ven if the Texas law . . . 
had been applied to opposite-sex as well as same-sex sodomy and had been enforced 
equally against both (or not enforced at all), it would still have been ‘anti-gay’ in terms of 
both its practical impact and its cultural significance.”). 
 283 See Strauss, 76 U Chi L Rev at 876, 881 (cited in note 5) (calling the statutes at 
issue in Griswold and Moore outliers). 
 284 Id at 886. 
 285 See, for example, Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution at 122 (cited in note 3) 
(noting the paucity of enforcement of antisodomy provisions); Klarman, From the Closet 
to the Altar at ix (cited in note 166) (same). 
 286 Lawrence, 539 US at 569. 
 287 See Tribe, 117 Harv L Rev at 1910 (cited in note 282). 
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statutes dating back to at least 1986, when the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Bowers v Hardwick288 affirmed the antisodomy meas-
ures that still could be located in twenty-four states.289 It would 
seem not only strained but downright strange to believe that 
Hardwick could be meaningfully construed as propping up out-
liers when exactly half of the states had such measures. Pursu-
ing such nonenforcement logic would open the theoretical possibil-
ity of calling a measure an outlier that existed, but was not 
enforced, in all fifty states. While negligible statutory enforce-
ment and a small number of statutes on the books may both 
render a law vulnerable to judicial challenge, those phenomena 
reach that final destination through conceptually distinct routes. 
The notion of outliers would already seem to contain quite 
enough analytical challenges without further complicating mat-
ters by collapsing the distinction between statutory prevalence 
and statutory desuetude.290 
B. Identifying Outliers 
If neither Brown, nor Loving, nor Lawrence should be 
viewed as a decision suppressing outliers because each opinion 
invalidated a law that was too widespread to merit use of the 
term, the question becomes: How many states can employ a law 
or practice before a measure becomes too widespread to accu-
rately be labeled an outlier? Over the last one hundred years of 
American history, the term outlier, in my view, should generally 
be reserved for describing laws or practices that can be found in 
fewer than ten states.291 If a practice can be found in ten or more 
 
 288 478 US 186 (1986). 
 289 See id at 198 n 1 (Powell concurring) (noting that twenty-four states had antisodomy 
laws). See also Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, 
Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 S Ct Rev 27, 40 (noting that antisodomy statutes over-
whelmingly went unenforced even in 1986). 
 290 See Sunstein, 2003 S Ct Rev at 55 (cited in note 289) (appearing to recognize a 
distinction between outlier statutes and generally unenforced statutes). 
 291 I limit the claim to the last one hundred years for two reasons. First, the term 
“constitutional outlier” has overwhelmingly been applied to cases decided within that 
timeframe. Second, the number of states in the Union has been extremely stable during 
that period, as the forty-eighth state was admitted in 1912. Obviously, if one were inter-
ested in identifying outlier cutoffs for earlier periods in American history, the number 
would need to be lowered to account for the smaller number of total jurisdictions. 
 My proposal for identifying outliers concentrates on counting the number of states 
that feature a particular measure in no small part because scholars who use the termi-
nology typically invoke that metric, when they endeavor to explain the concept at all. 
This method is, of course, far from the only way that one could identify outlying practices. 
One might alternately consider, for instance, the number of people residing in the states 
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states, it will typically be difficult to establish that the phe-
nomenon should be regarded as either isolated or unusual. The 
selection of a particular number to form the presumptive outer 
bound for outliers doubtless contains some measure of arbitrari-
ness. (Why not more than eight? Why not more than eleven?) Yet 
articulating a specific cap for the outlier phenomenon appears 
necessary to achieve greater consistency in how the term is 
used. Although invoking a softer term like “a handful of states” 
to describe the outlier maximum holds undeniable appeal, legal 
scholars have at least sometimes used that hazy term to de-
scribe a situation that may more accurately be characterized as 
involving two handfuls of states that are heaping.292 
Concerns about arbitrariness should not, however, be over-
blown for at least three reasons. First, this presumptive ten-
state threshold for outliers tracks how scholars have actually 
applied the term, at least in the mine-run of cases. The dubious 
application of outlier terminology to refer to some of the most 
high-profile cases that the Supreme Court has issued during the 
last sixty years should not be permitted to obscure how profes-
sors have generally employed the term. Outside of the Court’s 
decisions in Brown, Loving, and Lawrence, none of the leading 
scholars who frequently employ the term outlier so designated a 
practice that could be found in a double-digit number of states. 
It hardly seems surprising that some scholars have strained to 
apply the outlier label in an effort to demonstrate that a fa-
vored theory can accommodate these widely revered and widely 
discussed opinions.293 But beyond the settings of race and sexual 
orientation, the largest number of states that adopted a practice 
a legal scholar refers to as an outlier was nine.294 And in that 
 
that feature a particular practice, taken as a percentage of the overall nation, in deter-
mining whether the practice is actually anomalous. The nation’s fifty states have widely 
varying populations, after all, and these discrepancies are not captured by a metric that 
affords all fifty states equal weight. As will become clear, my proposal can account for 
these more sophisticated approaches to identifying outliers by inviting scholars to ex-
plain their criteria when they employ the terminology. 
 292 See, for example, Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution at 122 (cited in note 3) 
(describing Lawrence as invalidating “a Texas statute and a handful of other state laws” 
when the case invalidated laws in thirteen states). 
 293 In a very different context, Powe has advanced a version of this critique with 
considerable force: “To make the cases conform, theory becomes ideology with all the at-
tendant blinders. Commentators can and do wish theory and results conformed, and they 
often grant their own wishes. But that doesn’t make it so.” Powe, 11 Const Commen at 
214 (cited in note 166). 
 294 See Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 453 (cited in note 3) (stating that 
the election statutes at issue in Smith v Allwright existed only in nine states). 
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particular instance, the scholar seems to suggest that the outlier 
notion was approaching—or perhaps even had met—its breaking 
point.295 Typically, of course, scholars have applied the outlier tag 
to measures that exist in far fewer than nine states. Indeed, of 
the archetypal outlier opinions analyzed in Part I, the largest 
number of states that employed a particular practice was six, 
and several of the opinions invalidated measures that appeared 
in only one or two states.296 Yet while scholars have frequently 
applied the term outlier to measures that can be found in fewer 
than ten states, a maximum must of course be larger than the 
median. The ten-state threshold aims to strike the delicate bal-
ance between setting the cutoff so low as to exclude what are 
generally regarded as outlier-suppressing opinions and setting 
the cutoff so high as to distort the term beyond all recognition. 
Second, this ten-state approach to identifying opinions that 
do not fit into the outlier framework also enjoys at least some 
modest support in Supreme Court opinions. In Montana v Egel-
hoff,297 for example, the Court in 1996 reasoned—in a case 
weighing whether a state statute violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause—that the rule’s existence in 
ten jurisdictions, what the Court called “fully one-fifth of the 
States,” militated against concluding that the statute violated a 
fundamental principle.298 Egelhoff proceeded to refer to the contro-
verted statute as existing in “many States,” a term that one 
would avoid using to describe an outlier practice.299 Nor is Egel-
hoff the only Supreme Court opinion that has refused to treat a 
measure appearing in ten states as the sort of isolated phe-
nomenon associated with outliers. In Morgan v Virginia,300 the 
Supreme Court in 1946 invalidated a railroad segregation 
measure that appeared in ten states.301 Morgan in no way, how-
ever, suggested that the ten states made up a trivial percentage 
 
 295 See id (referring to several decisions invalidating a small number of state stat-
utes as suppressing outliers, and proceeding to note that “even Smith v. Allwright had 
implications for how primary elections were conducted in just nine southern states”) 
(emphasis added). 
 296 Kennedy invalidated laws in six states that permitted capital punishment for 
child rape. Kennedy, 554 US at 433. Griswold, Romer, Plyler, Moore, Coker, Virginia, and 
Lane all involved practices found in either one or two states. See text accompanying 
notes 21, 51, 54, 59–60, 68, 77–80, 87. 
 297 518 US 37 (1996). 
 298 Id at 48. 
 299 Id at 49. 
 300 328 US 373 (1946). 
 301 Id at 382, 385–86. 
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of the nation, but instead rested its conclusion on the need for 
uniformity.302 These sparse negative inferences should not, of 
course, be mistaken for a claim that the Supreme Court in any 
way recognizes some sort of ironclad “Rule of Ten” in judicial de-
cisionmaking. Such a claim would be risible. Nevertheless, that 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly resisted treating measures 
existing in ten states as merely marginal occurrences bolsters 
the conclusion that it would typically be misguided to label a 
measure an outlier that appears in ten or more states. 
Third, it bears emphasizing that the proposed ten-state 
maximum for outliers is soft rather than hard, meaning that the 
ten-state presumption against deeming a practice an outlier can 
be rebutted. Although I do not believe that the desuetude expla-
nation should suffice to rebut that presumption in the context of 
Lawrence, it is important to make clear that, in my view, at 
least some unusual circumstances do in fact manage to overcome 
this presumption against labeling measures outliers. For in-
stance, when the Supreme Court in Saenz v Roe303 in 1999 in-
validated California’s effort to limit the welfare benefits new 
California residents would receive to the amount they would 
have received from their prior state of residency, approximately 
fourteen other states had imposed similar residency restric-
tions.304 Despite the commonness of these welfare statutes, 
Saenz can still accurately be regarded as invalidating an outlier 
measure. In Saenz, the states had all enacted their statutes 
within the previous decade and, more importantly, those stat-
utes constituted throwbacks to durational-residency require-
ments that the Supreme Court had invalidated three decades 
earlier in Shapiro.305 Indeed, in the period leading up to Saenz, 
lower courts sometimes set aside the state measures as aberrant 
and impermissible efforts to revive Shapiro-style residential 
restrictions, even if the new welfare deprivations came in a rela-
tive rather than an absolute form.306 These lower court judges 
 
 302 See id at 386. 
 303 526 US 489 (1999). 
 304 See id at 492. See also Jack Tweedie, Building a Foundation for Change in Wel-
fare, 24 State Legislatures 26, 28 (Jan 1998) (noting that fourteen states lowered welfare 
benefits for new state residents). 
 305 Shapiro, 394 US at 622–23 & n 1, 638 (invalidating a Connecticut statute that 
prohibited new residents from receiving welfare benefits altogether because it impinged 
on the right to travel). 
 306 See, for example, Green v Anderson, 811 F Supp 516, 523 (ED Cal 1993) (granting a 
preliminary injunction against California’s new welfare residency requirement due to 
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effectively construed the revised welfare statutes as outliers in 
the post-Shapiro constitutional era, and it would seem peculiar 
to conclude that the Supreme Court did not issue an outlier-
suppressing opinion in Saenz simply because it made that same 
determination a few years later, after several more states had 
joined the throwback movement. Thus, although scholars have 
not understood Saenz as suppressing an outlier practice, it 
makes sense to do so. 
In all events, the vices associated with selecting a particular 
maximum for outliers are outweighed by the virtues that will 
flow from using that term with greater precision. It is essential, 
however, for this increased precision to be apparent to authors 
and readers alike. Thus, instead of silently applying the pro-
posed ten-state maximum—or any other maximum for that 
matter—scholars should adopt the practice of disclosing precisely 
how many states employed a measure when they contend that 
an opinion suppressed an outlier. Widespread adoption of that 
practice would have at least three beneficial effects.307 First, doing 
so would encourage the scholar contemplating using the term to 
reconsider whether the phenomenon was sufficiently isolated to 
merit calling it an outlier. Second, if the number of states en-
dorsing a practice is large enough to make using the term outlier 
seem awkward, the author could either select another term or 
endeavor to explain why the term applies despite the seemingly 
counterintuitive usage.308 Third, and most importantly, the practice 
would permit readers to make their own independent determi-
nations of whether the opinion may properly be construed as 
suppressing outliers. Adopting this convention would diminish 
the ambiguity that currently surrounds the term outlier, helping 
to advance the nation’s scholarly constitutional conversation. 
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, none of these proposals 
will definitively resolve whether every opinion in the Supreme 
Court’s history should be understood as involving an outlier 
practice. Marginal cases will require more fine-grained analysis 
 
Shapiro); Mitchell v Steffen, 504 NW2d 198, 199, 203 (Minn 1993) (invalidating Minnesota’s 
residency requirement in light of Shapiro). 
 307 At least one scholar already appears to follow this convention. Klarman admira-
bly indicates how widespread a practice is when he contends that a decision suppressed 
outliers. See, for example, Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 78, 85, 453 (cited 
in note 3). 
 308 For an application of this approach in another context, see Justin Driver, Recogniz-
ing Race, 112 Colum L Rev 404, 439 (2012) (encouraging judges to explain their reasons for 
invoking racial identity rather than simply assuming that the reasons speak for themselves). 
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to determine if the outlier appellation in fact applies. At a 
minimum, though, my hope is that the foregoing analysis both 
enables scholars to perceive that the term has been applied too 
promiscuously in the past, and encourages scholars to use the 
term in a more discerning, more transparent fashion in future 
writings. This analysis should provide a useful baseline against 
which to evaluate the outlier label’s applicability and encourage 
distinctions among various degrees of minority practices. Just as 
not every outlier should be construed as a holdout, it is impor-
tant to recognize that not every practice found in a minority of 
states should be construed as an outlier. 
Some scholars—given their assessments of Brown, Loving, 
and Lawrence—will almost certainly disagree with my norma-
tive view of how the territory of constitutional outliers is best 
demarcated. These scholars may well respond that my bounda-
ries for identifying what constitutes an outlier practice are un-
duly restrictive. The borders must be expanded, these scholars 
might claim, so that the outlying territory can encompass this 
pathbreaking precedent or that landmark opinion. Other scholars, 
conversely, may protest that my proposed boundaries are exces-
sively capacious and should be narrowed to exclude opinions 
they perceive as falling beyond outlier precincts. Although there 
may be disagreement, perhaps even discord, on the classification 
of particular cases, such exchanges should be welcomed because 
they will evince serious analysis of what constitutes a constitu-
tional outlier and why. And analysis of constitutional outliers—
as opposed to mere incantation—would represent a change that 
is long overdue. 
CONCLUSION 
During the last two decades, the term outlier has quickly 
attained a prominent position within scholarly constitutional 
conversation. Indeed, at times, that position has been ever so 
slightly too prominent, as scholars have periodically contended 
that landmark Supreme Court opinions invalidated outliers 
when the label seems an awkward fit to describe a practice that 
appears across reasonably large swaths of the nation. Even 
accounting for these false positives, though, the term’s status as 
an essential word in the modern constitutional scholar’s vocabu-
lary appears secure. The word has become indispensable because—
when properly used, at least—it readily conveys the Supreme 
Court’s rejection of measures found in only a small number of 
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states, a dynamic that applies to many opinions in constitutional 
law’s canon. 
Although professors frequently identify Supreme Court 
opinions as invalidating outliers, they have dedicated little intel-
lectual energy to explaining what the term actually means. The 
result is that, while references to outliers pervade legal scholar-
ship, the term itself has remained—in some meaningful sense—
stuck in the shadows, at once both prominent and peripheral. 
The shadows are, in C. Vann Woodward’s evocative phrase, “one 
of the favorite breeding places of mythology,”309 and it should 
come as little surprise to learn that the term outlier has proven 
generative in the mythmaking department. In an effort to ex-
pose those myths, this Article has cast an overhead spotlight on 
constitutional outliers by identifying the component parts that 
march behind the outlier banner, recognizing the important legal 
implications that flow from understanding that the term con-
tains multiple entities, and isolating the territory that lays 
beyond its conceptual borders. The term outlier is a useful one, 
but a persistent lack of scholarly examination has resulted in its 
severely diminished utility. In order to see outliers with clarity, 
it is necessary to bring them from the periphery of constitutional 
analysis to its very center. 
 
 309 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow xvi (Oxford 3d rev ed 1974). 
